Various Cost Allocation Methods.....................................................................................................1 by Key Conclusions
A Survey of  
Transmission Cost Allocation 
Issues, Methods and Practices
March 10, 2010
SM2 PJM © 2010
A Survey of Transmission Cost Allocation Issues, Methods and Practicesi PJM © 2010
A Survey of Transmission Cost Allocation Issues, Methods and Practices
Contents
Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................1
 “Who pays?”  ...............................................................................................................................1
Various Cost Allocation Methods  ....................................................................................................1
Key Conclusions ............................................................................................................................2
Consider priorities when determining cost allocation. ......................................................................................................................2
Cost allocation is a societal decision. ...............................................................................................................................................2
A combination of methods is common practice, reflecting the diversity of priorities........................................................................2
Introduction and Purpose  ...........................................................................................................3
SECTION 1: Transmission Basics  ................................................................................................5
 
Losses ..........................................................................................................................................6
 
Power Flows  ..................................................................................................................................7
Congestion  ....................................................................................................................................8
Transmission Siting and Aesthetics .................................................................................................8
The Costs of Transmission ..............................................................................................................8
SECTION 2: Why Build More Transmission?...............................................................................10
Reliability as a Driver of New Transmission  ...................................................................................10
Renewable Energy as a Driver of New Transmission ........................................................................10
Other Drivers/Benefits of Transmission Expansion ...........................................................................12
Reduction in System-Wide Production Costs and Congestion .........................................................................................................12
Changes in Energy Market Prices Benefit Some, Cost Others..........................................................................................................12
Public Policy Objectives ...................................................................................................................................................................13
Fuel Diversity and Impacts on Fuel Markets ....................................................................................................................................13
Capacity Market and Resource Adequacy Benefits..........................................................................................................................13
Increased Market Competitiveness/Decreased Market Power .........................................................................................................14
SECTION 3: Transmission Planning Overview  .............................................................................15
Transmission Planning = Reliability Planning + Market Efficiency  ....................................................15
One Regional Plan ...........................................................................................................................................................................15
Load Forecasting .............................................................................................................................................................................16
Merchant Transmission Interconnection Impacts  ............................................................................................................................16
Market Efficiency Upgrade Drivers  ...................................................................................................................................................17
How Transmission Planning Can Inform Cost Allocation ..................................................................17
SECTION 4: Allocation of Costs – Interpreting Beneficiaries and Socialization ..............................18
Beneficiaries ...............................................................................................................................18
Beneficiaries Defined by Power Flows ..............................................................................................................................................18
Defined in Monetary Terms...............................................................................................................................................................18
Defined in Broader Terms  .................................................................................................................................................................19
Socialization ...............................................................................................................................19ii PJM © 2010
A Survey of Transmission Cost Allocation Issues, Methods and Practices
SECTION 5: Evaluating Cost Allocation Methods – Practical Considerations .................................20
Understandability ........................................................................................................................20
Administrative Ease .....................................................................................................................20
Ability to Reflect System Changes Over Time..................................................................................20
Stability of Transmission Rates Resulting from Cost Allocation ........................................................20
Short-Term and Long-Term Incentives for Generation and Load  ........................................................20
Public Good and Externality Aspects of Transmission Infrastructure .................................................20
Public Good and Positive Externality Benefits Found in Transmission Planning Studies ................................................................21
Negative Externalities Evident in Transmission Planning Studies: Cross Border or Loop Flows .....................................................21
Public Good and Positive Externality Benefits Not Identified in Transmission Planning Studies ....................................................22
SECTION 6: Allocation of Costs – Generation Versus Load ..........................................................23
Allocating Costs to Load or Generation ..........................................................................................23
Allocating Costs to Load or Generation: U.S. Practices  ....................................................................23
Allocating Costs to Load or Generation: International Practices  ........................................................24
SECTION 7: Allocation of Costs over Megawatt-Hours of  Consumption and/or Generation .............27
U.S. Practice in Allocating Costs over Megawatt-Hours ...................................................................27
International Practice in Allocating Costs over Megawatt-Hours .......................................................27
Congestion and Marginal Loss Surplus, ARR/FTR Allocations and Cost Allocation .............................27
Transmission Planning Context .....................................................................................................28
Understandability and Administrative Ease ....................................................................................28
Changes Over Time ......................................................................................................................29
Stability of Rates  .........................................................................................................................29
Short-Term and Long-Term Incentives ...........................................................................................29
Implicit Recognition of the Public Good and Positive Externality Aspects .........................................29
SECTION 8: Allocation of Costs Over Peak MW Usage and/or Generation .....................................31
U.S. Practice in Allocating Costs over Peaks ..................................................................................31
International Practice in Allocating Costs over Peaks ......................................................................31
Transmission Planning Context .....................................................................................................32
Understandability and Administrative Ease ....................................................................................32
Changes Over Time ......................................................................................................................32
Stability of Rates  .........................................................................................................................32
Short-Term and Long-Term Incentives ...........................................................................................32
Implicit Recognition of Public Good and Positive Externality Aspects  ...............................................33
SECTION 9: Allocation of Costs by Flow-Based Methods  .............................................................34
Flow-Based Methods Defined  ........................................................................................................34
U.S. Practice in Allocating Costs by Flow Basis ..............................................................................34
Reliability-Based Upgrades .............................................................................................................................................................34
Economic-Based Upgrades .............................................................................................................................................................35
International Practice in Allocating Costs by Location or Flow Basis  .................................................35
Transmission Planning Context .....................................................................................................36
Understandability and Administrative Ease ....................................................................................36
Changes Over Time ......................................................................................................................37
Stability of Rates  .........................................................................................................................37iii PJM © 2010
A Survey of Transmission Cost Allocation Issues, Methods and Practices
Short-Term and Long-Term Incentives ...........................................................................................37
Implicit Recognition of Public Good and Positive Externality Aspects  ...............................................37
SECTION 10: Allocation of Costs via Monetary Metrics ...............................................................38
Application of Monetary Metrics  ....................................................................................................38
U.S. and International Practice in Allocating Costs through Monetary Metrics  ...................................38
Transmission Planning Context .....................................................................................................39
Understandability and Administrative Ease ....................................................................................39
Changes Over Time ......................................................................................................................40
Stability of Rates  .........................................................................................................................40
Short-Term and Long-Term Incentives ...........................................................................................40
Implicit Recognition of Public Good and Positive Externality Aspects  ...............................................40
SECTION 11: Moving Forward: Searching for Policy Consensus on a Cost Allocation Method .........41
Mixing and Matching Methodologies to Achieve Multiple Goals........................................................41
(Endnotes)  ..............................................................................................................................42
APPENDIX A: Guide of Cost Allocation Methods.........................................................................47
Defining Cost Allocation Methods   .................................................................................................47
Ways to Evaluate Cost Allocation Methods  ....................................................................................47
Appendix B: Matrix of U.S. RTO Transmission Cost Allocation Provisions .....................................49
PJM – Cost Allocation Practices  ....................................................................................................49
Southwest Power Pool (SPP) – Cost Allocation Practices .................................................................50
Midwest ISO (MISO) – Cost Allocation Practices ............................................................................51
New York ISO (NYISO) - Cost Allocation Practices ..........................................................................52
ISO New England (ISO-NE) – Cost Allocation Practices  ...................................................................53
Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) – Cost Allocation Practices  ..........................................54
California ISO (CAISO) – Cost Allocation Practices .........................................................................54
Appendix C: Matrix of Selected International Transmission Cost Allocation Provisions ...................551 PJM © 2010
A Survey of Transmission Cost Allocation Issues, Methods and Practices
Executive Summary
 “Who pays?” 
That simple question dominates the policy discussion about transmission expansion. The debate typically has 
centered on the choice between “beneficiary pays” and “socialization,” which have different meanings to different 
stakeholders. Generally, proponents of “beneficiary pays” argue that those parties benefitting from transmission 
should pay the costs of building transmission, with the implicit assumption that all benefits can be assigned to 
individual parties. Proponents of “socialization” argue the most important benefits – such as reliability – cannot 
be easily assigned because all parties enjoy these benefits, and therefore costs should be spread over all users 
connected to the transmission system.
In practice, there is no broad consensus on precise definitions for “beneficiary pays” or “socialization”, as evidenced 
by stakeholder disagreement over who should be considered beneficiaries or what constitutes socialization. Thus, 
it is exceedingly difficult to apportion transmission costs in a way that satisfies all stakeholders. Moreover, there 
may be other considerations, such as ease of administration and understanding, or stability of the allocation over 
time, that may drive stakeholder preferences for a particular allocation method.
As the nation’s economy rebounds, state and federal environmental mandates are implemented, and greater 
amounts of intermittent wind and solar generation (often located in remote locations) integrate into the grid, more 
transmission will be needed – yet the assignment of transmission costs remains among the electric industry’s 
most contentious issues.
Various Cost Allocation Methods 
PJM offers this document as a resource to inform debate and to encourage a common understanding of cost 
allocation issues. This survey classifies the various transmission cost allocation methods used in the United 
States and around the world. None of these five categories necessarily stand alone, but they provide a useful 
taxonomy for discussions about cost allocation. 
Transmission costs can be allocated:
•	 Between load and generation: A threshold question is whether to assess costs to load or generation. The 
general practice among RTOs in the U.S. is that load pays transmission costs. A contrasting view, which 
has been implemented in some other countries, is that generators use transmission to deliver energy to 
customers and therefore are beneficiaries that should be allocated some transmission costs. 
•	 By amount of usage:  Allocating  costs  based  on  the  annual  megawatt-hours  of  consumption  and/or 
generation, regardless of location or peak usage is a simple way to spread costs over a wide base under 
the implicit assumption beneficiaries are difficult to identify. 
•	 By peak consumption or generation: This method also spreads costs to all users of the transmission 
system based upon their maximum amount of load or generation, which is usually measured at the 
system peak, without regard to location.  
•	 By flow-basis: Power flow models that are used to plan future transmission and to determine locational 
marginal prices in energy markets can be used to identify users’ physical impacts on the transmission 
system by their location or the amount of power flows they affect. The “beneficiary pays” concept can 
be applied using this flow-based method.  
•	 By a monetary impact basis: This is a form of “beneficiary pays” that assigns costs to those parties 
who receive a monetary gain, such as changes in energy prices or production costs. This method is 
compatible within or between organized wholesale markets that use locational pricing, where economic 
benefits of proposed projects can be estimated through market simulations.  A Survey of Transmission Cost Allocation Issues, Methods and Practices
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Key Conclusions
Consider priorities when determining cost allocation.
The choice of allocation method depends on the priorities stakeholders place on 
the type of benefits and practical considerations. For example, stakeholders may 
suggest  that  some  costs  be  allocated  through  flow-based  or  monetary  metric 
methods  because  it’s  important  to  identify  and  ensure  that  “beneficiaries”  are 
specifically allocated costs, and it is important for cost allocation to be consistent 
with transmission planning. Implicit in this choice is that ease of understanding and 
administrative burden are not too important.
Conversely, if there is a strong emphasis on grid reliability which benefits everyone, 
or the fact that all users benefit from reduced losses with new transmission facilities, 
or if ease of understanding and administration are important, then allocating costs 
across all MWh or all peak MW may be considered desirable. 
Cost allocation is a societal decision.
Cost allocation is a public policy mixed with engineering, economic and political 
considerations. By its very nature, cost allocation must serve individual as well 
as  collective  interests.  It  demands  regulatory  prescription  or  approval,  just  like 
transmission siting and reliability. 
A combination of methods is common practice, reflecting the diversity of priorities.
U.S.  and  international  practice  with  regard  to  cost  allocation  show  a  pattern   
of  “mixing  and  matching”  elements  of  the  various  methods  for  allocating 
transmission costs. 
Most ISOs and RTOs in the U.S. use this hybrid “mix and match” approach, spreading 
some costs over peak MW to load while other costs are allocated using flow-based 
methods. Internationally, there is a willingness to “mix and match” different cost 
allocation methods as well. Reasonable arguments support all of these methods.
PJM has produced this document to advance the discussion of cost allocation and to 
facilitate a shared understanding of the issues. This paper does not espouse a particular 
policy or methodology. PJM encourages further discussion among interested stakeholders 
that would help policy makers and regulators decide how to best build future electric 
infrastructure.3 PJM © 2010
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Introduction and Purpose
Transmission cost allocation is a subject of considerable debate among various 
stakeholders in the electricity industry. From the perspective of state regulators and 
load interests, cost allocation raises questions of increased or reduced electricity 
rates for end-use customers. For other stakeholders, it is a question of allocating 
the  costs  to  the  beneficiaries  of  new  transmission  projects,  although  there  are 
differences  of  opinion  about  who  benefits.  Renewable  energy  developers  and 
advocates view transmission cost allocation as 
a significant determinant to the development 
and delivery of renewable resources, especially 
wind generation, in a political climate where 
carbon reduction is high on the agenda.
End-use  customer  rates  will  be  determined 
based on the cost allocation methodology used. 
Some  stakeholders  advocate  “socializing,” 
or spreading new transmission costs as widely as possible to facilitate renewable 
resources required under either state-driven renewable portfolio standards (RPS) 
or federal environmental requirements currently under consideration. However, the 
idea of socializing transmission costs is being met with great resistance from those 
who argue that only the beneficiaries of new transmission assets should pay. In 
addition, parties have argued that the socialization of transmission costs masks 
the true delivered cost of power from specific resources and therefore distorts the 
generation and consumption incentives of different resources or loads.
With  possible  federal  legislation,1  the  need  for  the  Federal  Energy  Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) to revisit transmission cost allocation, and various stakeholder 
groups pressing their ideas of what constitutes the correct or best method for allocating 
transmission costs, PJM believes the debate would be better informed if everyone 
had a shared understanding of the general classes of allocation methodologies used 
across the United States and internationally, as well as specific applications of such 
methodologies.
This  paper  surveys  a  variety  of  transmission  cost  allocation  methodologies  and 
evaluates their respective properties across several dimensions. The first part of 
the paper offers an overview of existing transmission and an examination of its 
costs, and likely new transmission needs and their drivers, including reliability and 
renewable energy. A description of transmission planning, including how studies are 
conducted, is essential to understanding the kinds of benefits transmission planning 
identifies and places cost allocation methodologies into context.
This paper also reviews the benefits of transmission expansion, such as enhanced 
reliability, reduced production costs and other potential benefits, including risk 
mitigation, achieving public policy goals, impacts on fuel markets and enhanced 
competitiveness. A further discussion of the benefits of transmission provides a 
basis for identifying potential “beneficiaries” of transmission expansion.
An examination of the possible cost allocation methodologies, starts with a review of 
common terminology regarding transmission cost allocation, such as beneficiaries, 
beneficiary pays and socialization of costs. There are dimensions in which cost 
allocation methodologies can be viewed other than in the strict confines of benefits 
Renewable  energy  developers  and 
advocates  view  transmission  cost 
allocation  as  a  significant  determinant 
to  the  development  and  delivery  of 
renewable  resources,  especially  wind 
generation, in a political climate where 
carbon reduction is high on the agenda.A Survey of Transmission Cost Allocation Issues, Methods and Practices
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and beneficiaries, such as the ease of understanding, stability, ease of administration 
and recognition of public good.
An examination follows of arguments about the allocation of costs to loads alone, 
as has been the case historically in the U.S., or whether to allocate some of these 
costs to generation. The classes of cost allocation methods are defined and placed 
in the context of transmission planning and the other benefits and dimensions cited 
earlier. A survey of transmission cost allocation methods employed in RTO markets 
in the United States and internationally leads to a concluding discussion of what 
might be considered an “appropriate” cost allocation mechanism.
The ultimate conclusion that can be reached is that the appropriate allocation 
mechanism  will  depend  upon  what  dimensions  interested  stakeholders  and/or 
regulators believe are the most important because reasonable arguments can be 
made to support a variety of cost allocation mechanisms.
The purpose of this paper, however, is informational only, so that electricity industry 
participants  and  policymakers  can  arrive  at  more  fully  informed  decisions.  In 
particular, PJM is not recommending a preferred cost allocation methodology.5 PJM © 2010
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SECTION 1: Transmission Basics
Transmission refers to the physical assets or equipment (lines, towers, transformers, etc.) that facilitate the 
movement of electric energy from one location to another. From a physical perspective a transmission system 
is a collection of physical assets that are interconnected and operated in a synchronized manner. These assets 
include:
•	 network transmission facilities, which generally includes equipment for voltage levels higher than 
100 kilovolts (kV);
•	 local distribution facilities, which are lines and equipment that deliver electricity directly to end 
users, and
•	 interconnection  facilities,  which  tie  the  transmission  system  to  resources  where  electricity  is 
generated.
 
This paper focuses on network transmission because the various principles, methods and results for allocating 
the costs to build these high-voltage facilities are among the most contentious within the electricity policy 
arena. As the need for transmission grows as expected over the next decade, an improved understanding of the 
fundamental drivers for these different cost allocation methods is necessary to resolve some of these difficult 
issues.
There are four transmission interconnections in North America under the reliability supervision of the North 
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC):
1.  the Eastern Interconnection, comprising most of the United States and Canada east of the Rocky 
Mountains;
2.  the Western Interconnection, comprising the United States and Canada west of the Rockies;
3.  the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), which includes most of Texas, and
4.  the Quebec transmission system in Canada.
As of 2008, these four interconnections had in service over 445,000 miles of transmission at voltages greater 
than 100 kV (100,000 volts).2 This includes 273,000 miles in the Eastern Interconnection, 120,000 miles in 
the Western Interconnection, 29,000 miles in ERCOT and 23,000 miles in Quebec.
These four transmission interconnections cross political, corporate and organizational boundaries. The designation 
of a transmission system is commonly used for areas within an interconnection that are managed by regional 
entities. These smaller, regional transmission systems remain electrically linked to the entire interconnection and 
can constitute very large and complex networks by themselves. The actual operating and planning responsibilities 
have evolved toward regional organizations whose scope may range across multiple states or be limited to one 
small city.
This paper adopts the common usage of a transmission system as the physical system managed by a single 
transmission operator – because the various ways that transmission on each “system” is paid for is determined 
through (but not necessarily by) each operator.
Transmission under the control of independent system operators (ISOs) or RTOs in North America, which serve 
two-thirds of the population, is shown in Table 1 below. The transmission figures below are broken down by 
voltage level and reveal that:
•	 67 percent of the ISO/RTO transmission in service is at less than 230 kV, meaning that generally most 
of the transmission currently is intended to serve localized needs rather than for moving large amounts 
of power over long distances to serve load;36 PJM © 2010
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•	 transmission at 345 kV and above is generally used to move large amounts of power over longer distances 
as higher voltages result in reduced power losses over long distances;
•	 of all of the ISO/RTOs, PJM has the largest amount of transmission at 345 kV and above (almost 
12,500 miles), which accounts for just over 20 percent of all circuit miles in PJM.
Table 1: Transmission System Characteristics of ISOs/RTOs in North America
RTO Population 
(Millions)
Generation 
Capacity 
(MW)
Peak Load
(MW)
Miles of Transmission
< 230 kV 230 kV 345 kV 500 kV 765 kV Total 
Miles
AESO 
(Alberta)
4 12,163 9,806 8,976 4,714 198 13,888
California ISO
(California)
30 57,124 50,270 13,668 8,627 3,103 25,398
ERCOT 
(Texas)
22 88,227 62,399 31,410 8,917 40,327
ISO New 
England
14 33,700 28,130 5,603 443 2,084 8,130
Midwest ISO 40 159,900 116,030 35,557 3,541 10,695 442 50,235
NBSO
(New 
Brunswick)
2 7,000 3,187 5,800 1,100 1,110 8,000
NYISO
(New York)
19 40,685 33,393 6,772 1,080 2,815 71 155 10,893
PJM 51 164,895 144,644 36,789 7,228 2,901 7,366 2,215 56,499
IESO 
(Ontario)
13 35,338 25,737 6,959 8,836 4 2,361 18,160
SPP 5 63,000 42,891 36,664 3,531 6,620 106 46,921
Total 200 662,032 188,198 39,100 35,136 13,647 2,370 278,451
Source:  ISO/RTO  at  a  Glance  available  at  http://www.isorto.org/atf/cf/%7B5B4E85C6-7EAC-40A0-8DC3-003829518EBD%7D/ISO_RTO_At_A_
Glance.pdf
 
Losses
The movement of electricity over distances results in losses. For a given flow of power, transmission losses are 
reduced exponentially with higher voltages. Figure 1 below provided by American Electric Power shows the 
impact on line losses for 345 kV, 500 kV and 765 kV transmission lines.4 Transmission lines of 500 kV reduce 
line losses approximately 75 percent relative to 345 kV, and 765 kV transmission lines offers between 85 and   
90 percent reductions in losses relative to 345 kV.
At a 2008 PJM load-weighted average LMP of $71.00/MWh, the difference in losses between a 345 kV line   
and  a  500  kV  line  moving  2,000  MW  over  100  miles  in  every  hour  of  the  year  would  be  approximately   
$75 million/year.57 PJM © 2010
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Figure 1: Losses for Power Flows (100 Miles)
 
Power Flows
Unlike water, petroleum or natural gas that flows through a pipeline infrastructure 
that can be controlled and directed through mechanical means, electricity flows on 
the physical transmission system over the path of least impedance.6 The implication 
of this physical property is that the flows of power from a generator to a load will 
impact transmission assets along parallel paths or create “loop flows” that do not 
respect political or organizational borders.7
An example using Figure 2 below shows this principle.
Figure 2: Loop Flows
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In Figure 2, suppose there is a generator in Ontario operating in the Independent 
System Operator of Ontario (IESO) that wishes to sell power to a load in New York 
Independent System Operator (NYISO). The two transmission systems in question 
are next to each other, and intuitively one would expect power to flow directly from 
the IESO to the NYISO. However, because power moves over the path of least 
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
0
20
L
o
s
s
e
s
 
(
M
W
)
Power (MW)
765 kV
500 kV
345 kV
500 1,000 1,500 2,000A Survey of Transmission Cost Allocation Issues, Methods and Practices
8 PJM © 2010
impedance, some power may flow in a loop or parallel path to be delivered to the 
load. In this figure, only 60 percent of the actual power generated in the IESO and 
used in the NYISO directly flows to the NYISO. The remaining 40 percent flows in a 
loop through the Midwest ISO and PJM to reach the NYISO load.8
The  same  types  of  loop  flows  occur  regularly  within  and  between  other  ISOs 
and RTOs. Because there are loop flows that occur on the transmission system, 
transmission expansion happening in one system – PJM, for example – may allow 
more transactions to be scheduled or dispatched between generation and load in 
other systems to the benefit of others.
Congestion
Congestion occurs when flows over transmission assets reach operating limits. To 
reduce overloads and service disruptions and damage, it is necessary to redispatch 
generation (i.e. to run other generators that may have a higher cost). Transmission 
expansion, by increasing the amount of power that can move across a transmission 
system, can help reduce the costs of redispatching generation.
Transmission Siting and Aesthetics
The permitting and siting of new transmission has its own set of challenges regarding 
the amount of right-of-way required and the height of transmission towers that critics 
contend reduce the visual beauty of the landscape. Where possible, new transmission 
projects and upgrades attempt to use the same right-of-way to minimize the impact 
of new transmission. Delays in putting needed new transmission into service due 
to siting and permitting issues have been noted by NERC as an impediment to 
maintaining reliability in the future.9
Higher voltage levels of new transmission result in several benefits: lower losses, 
greater cost-effectiveness and smaller physical footprints which can potentially ease 
concerns over the aesthetics that are often a sticking point in siting and permitting 
processes. According to AEP, a single-circuit 765 kV line can carry as much power 
as six single-circuit or three double-circuit 345 kV lines with towers of similar height, 
with a fraction of the right-of-way.10
The Costs of Transmission
Transmission costs as a portion of the delivered cost of power to retail customers 
is a relatively small part of the overall bill, with estimates ranging from only 8 to 
10 percent of the overall retail bill.11 The cost of transmission billed through PJM 
on a per MWh basis was $3.94/MWh in 2009.12 Even with the lower energy prices 
observed in 2009, transmission accounts for only 7.1 percent of wholesale power 
costs in 2009.
Figure 3 below shows the share of transmission costs relative to other wholesale 
market costs within PJM for 2009.139 PJM © 2010
A Survey of Transmission Cost Allocation Issues, Methods and Practices
Figure 3: PJM Wholesale Cost Full-Year 2009 ($/MWh)
The Brattle Group recently published a study for EEI, “Transforming America’s Power Industry: The Investment 
Challenge for 2010-2030” that examined the transmission projects under development by EEI members to 
provide an average cost of new transmission per mile of line, and cost per Gigawatt-mile (GW-mile) of line. 
The results of that exercise are reproduced in Table 2 below.14 There exist other cost estimates for constructing 
transmission at various voltages, but most of these estimates are hypothetical and are not tied to projects that are 
actually under development or do not cover as broad a range of voltages as do the Brattle estimates.15
Table 2: Estimated Costs of New Transmission by Voltage Level Based on Projects under Development
230 kV 345 kV 500 kV 765 kV
Cost
(Million $ /mile)
$2.0 $2.5 $4.3 $6.6
Cost
(Million $ /GW-mile)
$5.46 $2.85 $1.45 $1.32
Source:  Brattle  Group,  Transforming  America’s  Power  Industry:  The  Investment  Challenge  for  2010-2030  at  35,  available  at  http://www.brattle.com/
documents/UploadLibrary/Upload725.pdf
In short, transmission expansion is expensive with total costs in the billions of dollars, but the impact of 
transmission costs on the total cost of wholesale power is relatively small.
Transmission, 3.94
Regulation, 0.33
Operating Reserve, 0.46 
PJM Cost, 0.23 Synchronized  Reserve, 0.05
Black Start, 0.02
Trans. Owners Control, 0.08
Reactive, 0.35
Reliability (Capacity), 10.79 
Energy, 39.05
Total: $55.31/MWh
* values are PJM averages 
and do not reflect potential
locational cost differences10 PJM © 2010
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SECTION 2: Why Build More Transmission?
Until the onset of the current recession, load historically has grown between one and two percent per year. As 
economic activity increases, future load growth can lead to reliability problems if transmission infrastructure 
does not keep up with growing demand and the expanding generating capacity. Although reliability drives most 
new transmission, there are other drivers that must be taken into account, such as renewable energy, system-
wide production costs, changes in energy market prices, public policy objectives and fuel diversity goals and 
impacts on fuel markets.
Reliability as a Driver of New Transmission 
The transmission planning processes identifies facilities needed to ensure that there are no violations of transmission 
reliability or generation deliverability standards. NERC cites reliability as one primary driver for transmission 
expansion at 200 kV and above, accounting for 35 percent of new transmission to be built.16 According to 
NERC in its 2009 Long-Term Reliability Assessment (2009 LTRA), through 2018, under construction, planned, 
or conceptual total new transmission at 100 kV and above will increase by 5.5 percent (15,000 miles) in the 
Eastern Interconnection and by 8 percent (35,500 miles) in all of NERC in large part to meet future reliability 
challenges.17
One example of a reliability violation occurs when there is enough capacity to serve load system-wide, but load 
growth in a particular location on the system is such that the infrastructure is inadequate to avoid an overload at 
that location. In this case, a transmission upgrade would be required to ensure that load could be reliably served. 
In this way, reliability is a benefit that is enjoyed by load in a constrained location that allows firm load to be 
served at all times, and enjoyed by others on the system whose risk of cascading failures is significantly reduced.
In addition to reliability maintenance and improvements identified in transmission planning processes, it has also 
been argued that transmission expansion can guard against and/or mitigate extreme reliability events that involve 
multiple contingencies occurring simultaneously. One estimate of the avoided cost of such a rare occurrence, 
such as the 2003 Northeast blackout, is $5 billion to $10 billion.18
Renewable Energy as a Driver of New Transmission
NERC estimates that over 260,000 MW of renewable generation will be in use in North America by 2018, with 
96 percent being wind and solar.19 In the ReliabilityFirst Corp. (RFC) region, which comprises most of PJM and 
part of the Midwest ISO, NERC estimates there will be more than 45,700 MW of wind by 2018.20, 21
NERC  also  notes  that  35  percent  of  new  transmission  above  200  kV  across  North  America  is  related  to 
accommodating renewable resources, which stands in sharp contrast to the seven percent of transmission driven 
by more traditional generating resources.22 The recent U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) study on Wind Energy, 
estimates that the transmission needed between now and 2030 to achieve 20 percent of generation from wind 
would cost $60 billion.23
The importance of building transmission to integrate renewable energy has also been recognized in an EEI 
study, Transmission Projects: Supporting Renewable Resources, that outlines $21 billion in transmission projects 
already under development that will help support renewable energy construction.24 The EEI report acknowledges 
that transmission projects are not developed solely for integrating renewable resources, but may have other 
benefits, such as ensuring reliability and reducing congestion and line losses.
The need for new transmission to support renewable energy development can be readily confirmed by examining 
the number of states with a renewable portfolio standard (RPS) or alternative energy portfolio standards (AEPS) 
shown in Figure 4.2511 PJM © 2010
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Figure 4: Renewable Portfolio
 
 
Within the PJM footprint, every jurisdiction has an RPS or AEPS or non-binding goal except for Indiana, Kentucky 
and Tennessee. These goals range from 12.5 percent in North Carolina up to 25 percent in Ohio by 2025.
NERC estimates that many of these standards will likely be met with wind generation. As seen in Figure 5, much 
of the wind potential that could be delivered into Eastern load centers is along the Appalachian Mountains; in the 
Midwest, particularly in the Great Plains; and off the shore of the East Coast.
Regardless of the location of wind power, there will be a need for transmission to help deliver that power to the 
load where it is desired to meet demand and RPS/AEPS goals.26
 
Figure 5: Proposed Wind in PJM Interconnection Queues
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Other Drivers/Benefits of Transmission Expansion
In addition to the reliability and renewable energy policy drivers, there are other cited drivers/benefits that are 
attributed to transmission expansion. These include reductions in system-wide production costs as a result of 
reduced congestion, changes in energy market prices and achieving public policy objectives beyond RPS goals. 
Others are fuel diversity and impacts on fuel markets, reducing the cost of capacity adequacy and changing 
capacity market prices, and enhanced competitiveness or reducing the potential for market power in wholesale 
power markets.
Reduction in System-Wide Production Costs and Congestion
One major benefit of transmission expansion is the reduction in system-wide production costs, which can be 
observed in lower congestion costs and reductions in line losses. While the NERC’s 2009 Long-Term Reliability 
Assessment cites economic congestion as a driver for only five percent of future transmission expansion,27 
transmission expansion driven by reliability will also likely reduce congestion costs for transmission users.
The objective of wholesale energy markets and power system dispatch in general is to minimize the production 
cost of generating and delivering electricity to loads. Absent any delivery constraints to deliver power from 
generation to load, the wholesale market and system dispatch will select the lowest-cost units to generate 
electricity to meet demand.
In reality, transmission constraints exist that do not permit wholesale energy markets or system dispatch to 
achieve the hypothetical least-cost solution. For wholesale markets and system dispatch to match generation and 
demand in real-time, it requires a redispatch of generation resources, such that higher-cost resources must be 
used so that transmission constraints are not violated and load can be served. These extra congestion costs are 
reflected in locational marginal prices (LMPs) in markets like PJM’s.
Table 3 below presents congestion costs in PJM over the past five years. Congestion costs have been in excess 
of $1.6 billion annually until 2009, when reduced demand and power prices, mild weather and the recession 
reduced power prices.
 
Table 3: Market Value of Congestion in PJM’s Energy Market 2005-2009 ($ Billion)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
$2.12  $1.6  $1.9  $2.1 $ 0.8 
 
The market efficiency analysis of the PJM 2008 RTEP shows that the identified reliability-driven upgrades would 
have reduced congestion costs to $203 million in 2008 if the upgrades been in place, a savings of nearly $2 billion.28 
The  2008  RTEP  shows  that  for  2011,  congestion  costs  with  the  upgrades  in  place  are  expected  to  be   
$158 million for a savings of $1.25 billion over simulated congestion absent the reliability upgrades.29
Changes in Energy Market Prices Benefit Some, Cost Others
Changes in wholesale market energy prices are often cited as another measure of benefits that may accrue to 
parties from transmission expansion. To the extent that lower prices are a result of reductions in production cost, 
they do reflect benefits of transmission expansion. However, changes in wholesale market prices associated with 
energy expenditures and revenues, after accounting for reduced production cost, may not be considered benefits 
on a system-wide basis because they also reflect transfers between generators and loads.30
From the perspective of loads located in constrained-in areas of the transmission system, reductions in congestion 
and wholesale market power prices resulting from transmission expansion provide benefit insofar as their energy 
expenditures are reduced. In contrast, suppliers located in the same constrained-in area that are impacted by 
reduced wholesale market prices incur reduced revenues and profits due to the transmission expansion. While 
production costs may be reduced, and individual parties can be identified that benefit or incur costs because 
of transmission expansion, the reduction in congestion that results in transfers from suppliers to load cannot be 
counted as a benefit on a system-wide basis.13 PJM © 2010
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For loads located upstream of congested transmission facilities, wholesale market 
prices may actually increase as congestion is eliminated and wholesale power prices 
converge to a system-wide price that is between the price in the constrained area and 
the price upstream of congestion. In this case, the load upstream of the now-relieved 
congestion observes higher wholesale energy market prices and consequently an 
increase in energy expenditures. Conversely, suppliers upstream of the formerly 
congested transmission facilities enjoy higher wholesale energy market prices and 
higher energy market revenues and market rents. Again, while individual parties can 
be identified who receive benefits or incur costs on a system-wide basis these are 
transfers from load to generation.
Public Policy Objectives
In addition to the benefit of the integration of renewable resources in achieving 
state and federal policy goals, transmission expansion enables greater access to 
renewable resources, such as wind far from load.31 New transmission to interconnect 
emissions-free renewable resources also helps achieve emissions reductions that 
are primary goals of the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), regional climate changes 
programs, such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), and potential 
federal climate-change policy.
There may also be economic development objectives as has been evidenced by 
the current administration’s desire to fund infrastructure projects that will create 
jobs,  increase  the  tax  base  and  provide  an  overall  fiscal  stimulus  to  move  the 
economy out of recession. The effects will be first seen through local or regional 
development in terms of creating construction jobs and expanding the tax base 
related to the transmission project itself.32 There may also be additional job creation 
and tax base enhancement for other regions that see an influx of new renewable 
or  fossil  generation  that  will  be  able  to  interconnect  because  of  the  increased 
transmission capability.
Fuel Diversity and Impacts on Fuel Markets
Another  cited  potential  benefit  from  transmission  expansion  is  fuel  diversity 
and mitigating price increases in fuel markets.33 Fuel diversity can provide risk 
mitigation related to price spikes in fuel markets, such as the natural gas market, 
by diversifying the portfolio of resources and reducing dependence on any one 
fuel. Transmission that accesses lower-cost resources, such as coal or wind power 
resources, can smooth out spikes in prices for peaking fuels, such as natural gas, 
and reduce overall production costs.
Capacity Market and Resource Adequacy Benefits
In a manner similar to the discussion of energy market benefits related to reduced 
production costs, transmission expansion may also reduce the overall cost of meeting 
resource  adequacy  requirements  through  capacity  markets.34  Capacity  resource 
costs can be reduced at system peaks through two factors: one is the reduced line 
losses, lowering the amount of capacity required at peak, and the second is through 
the increased transfer capability that may make lower-cost resources deliverable to 
load centers.
However, it is also critical to recognize the benefits and costs that accrue to individual 
parties in the context of locational capacity markets, such as PJM’s Reliability 
Pricing Model (RPM), ISO New England’s Forward Capacity Market (FCM) and the 
New York ISO Installed Capacity Market. Many of these benefits and costs cancel 
each other out in the form of transfers between suppliers and load. Areas once 
capacity-constrained may see capacity prices fall, with loads experiencing reduced A Survey of Transmission Cost Allocation Issues, Methods and Practices
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capacity expenditures and suppliers experiencing reduced revenues. By the same 
token, in areas previously upstream from congested facilities, capacity prices would 
rise, leading to increased revenues for suppliers and increased capacity expenditures 
for loads in these areas.
Increased Market Competitiveness/Decreased Market Power
It has been noted that transmission upgrades also improve market competitiveness, 
especially in previously constrained regions that are opened to greater sources of 
supply.35 Increased availability of supply with more diverse ownership will make the 
market more structurally competitive in that the ownership of supply resources is 
less concentrated. 
In the context of PJM’s structural market power test, it also is less likely there 
will be three pivotal suppliers in any market that would require the application of 
market power mitigation in the form of cost-based supply offers.36 In fact, with fewer 
occurrences of transmission constraints in PJM, there would be fewer occasions 
in which the three pivotal supplier test would need to be run to test for structural 
market power.
Structural market power is not indicative of attempts to exercise market power, but 
merely determines whether market power might be exercised. The PJM Independent 
Market  Monitor  has  consistently  found  that  PJM’s  Energy  Market  results  are 
competitive even in the presence of transmission constraints.37 PJM has shown that 
for 2008 market-based offer behavior of coal and natural gas units is within a tight 
band of +/- 4 percent of the cost-based offers used in market power mitigation.3815 PJM © 2010
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SECTION 3: Transmission Planning Overview
It is difficult to assess different cost allocation methodologies without first understanding the inputs to, and 
technical exercise of, transmission planning. One of the overarching goals of the planning process is to ensure 
the transmission system satisfies reliability requirements. Another consideration in the planning process 
is market efficiency or market impacts. This section explains PJM’s Regional Transmission Expansion Plan 
(RTEP) as an example of how planning processes may serve as a lens through which to view and compare cost 
allocation methodologies.
Transmission Planning = Reliability Planning + Market Efficiency
PJM’s RTEP identifies transmission system additions and improvements needed to keep electricity flowing to   
51 million people throughout 13 states and the District of Columbia.
Power flow studies are conducted that test the transmission system using mandatory national standards and 
RFC regional standards. These studies look 15 years into the future to identify transmission overloads, voltage 
limitations and other reliability standards violations. PJM then develops transmission plans to resolve violations 
that could otherwise lead to overloads and blackouts. These plans are examined for their feasibility, impact and 
costs and are discussed throughout the development process with PJM stakeholders.
Reliability planning addresses the fundamental need to keep the lights on. The market efficiency component 
of planning seeks to identify transmission enhancements that lower costs to consumers by relieving congested 
lines and allowing lower-cost power to flow to consumers. Projects that improve reliability also will likely reduce 
congestion costs and overall production costs.
PJM’s RTEP process encompasses a comprehensive assessment of the ability of the PJM system to meet all 
applicable reliability planning criteria. The process assesses system compliance over the 15-year planning horizon 
with the thermal, reactive and stability requirements of all applicable standards, including NERC Standards. 
When PJM identifies violations of NERC Reliability Standards it develops and implements solutions to mitigate 
those violations.
One Regional Plan
PJM’s RTEP process includes both five-year and 15-year plans. Five-year planning enables PJM to assess and 
recommend transmission upgrades to meet forecasted near-term load growth and to ensure the safe and reliable 
interconnection of new generation and merchant transmission projects. A 15-year horizon also allows PJM to 
consider the aggregate effects of many system trends, including long-term load growth, generation deactivation 
and broader generation development patterns across PJM, as well as the evolution of energy efficiency and 
demand response. These and myriad other drivers are depicted in Figure 6.3916 PJM © 2010
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Figure 6: Regional Transmission Expansion Plan Development Drivers
 
 
This process culminates in one recommended plan, the RTEP, for the entire PJM footprint that is submitted to 
PJM’s independent Board of Managers for consideration and approval. Its approval then binds transmission-
owning utilities to construct the approved upgrades and new transmission. The outcome of PJM’s annual RTEP 
process is a PJM Board-approved set of baseline and network upgrades.
New RTEP recommendations are submitted to PJM’s Board periodically throughout the year to resolve identified 
potential reliability criteria violations. Once approved, they become part of PJM’s overall RTEP.
Load Forecasting
One  of  the  core  principles  of  PJM’s  planning  process  is  the  consideration  of  all  drivers  that  impact  grid 
infrastructure planning needs and the integration of all solutions available to meet those needs. Load forecasting 
is a fundamental, key driver of resource adequacy requirements and transmission expansion plans. At its most 
fundamental, transmission planning is an assessment of load-generation balance.
Current, comprehensive zonal load forecasts are essential if transmission expansion studies are to yield plans that 
will continue to ensure reliable and economic system operations. PJM’s load forecasting model incorporates three 
classes of variables: economic conditions, weather effects and time of year.
As the recent U.S. economic recession demonstrated, demand for electricity bears a direct correlation to economic 
factors. Specifically, PJM uses Gross Metropolitan Product (GMP) in its forecast model, which allows for a 
localized treatment of economic effects within a zone. GMP is a concept analogous to the commonly reported 
U.S. Gross Domestic Product. GMP measures the total annual value of goods and services at a metropolitan level. 
PJM uses an outside economic services provide for economic forecasts for all areas within the PJM footprint.
Merchant Transmission Interconnection Impacts
Once thought to offer a long-term solution to long-distance transmission needs, few large capacity merchant 
transmission proposals have emerged within PJM. Those that have been built to date include a PJM terminus   
in northern New Jersey and a New York ISO terminus in New York City or Long Island. From a transmission 
planning perspective, these merchant transmission projects essentially have the same affect as new load in 
eastern PJM.
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Market Efficiency Upgrade Drivers
Market  efficiency  analysis  is  performed  as  part  of  the  overall  RTEP  process  to 
accomplish the following objectives:
•	 Determine which reliability upgrades, if any, will have an economic benefit 
if accelerated or modified.
•	 Identify new transmission upgrades that may result in economic benefits.
•	 Identify  economic  benefits  associated  with  modifications  to  reliability-
based enhancements already included in RTEP that would relieve one or 
more economic constraints. Such upgrades resolve reliability issues but 
are intentionally designed in a more robust manner to provide economic 
benefits.
PJM market efficiency analysis employs a market simulation tool that models hourly 
security-constrained generation commitment and dispatch over a defined future 
annual  period.  Economic  benefits  of  transmission  upgrades  are  determined  by 
comparing results of simulations with and without defined transmission upgrades. 
Prior to each RTEP cycle, PJM reviews with stakeholders the key analytical parameters 
to be used: including fuel costs, emissions costs, future generation scenarios, load 
forecasts and demand response projections.
As an example, a major transmission project in western Pennsylvania was vetted 
through PJM’s stakeholder process in December 2009 and approved by PJM’s Board 
in January 2010 using market efficiency analysis.
How Transmission Planning Can Inform Cost Allocation
Transmission planning can be summarized in two steps:
•	 Using power flow models to identify potential reliability or deliverability 
violations may exist at forecast system peaks and to determine a set of 
possible transmission solutions that solve the identified reliability and/or 
deliverability violations.
•	 Using a market simulation tool to examine the market efficiency impacts of 
proposed transmission solutions by examining changes in production cost, 
congestion and prices.
Essentially, transmission planning identifies the benefits of transmission expansion 
in  terms  of  maintaining  or  improving  reliability  and  reducing  production  costs 
as shown in market efficiency analyses. To the extent that renewable resources 
such as wind are in the interconnection queue, the integration of these resources 
helps maintain reliability. The location and levels of load and generation within 
the transmission system not only determine whether there might be reliability or 
deliverability violations, but will also influence the set of possible transmission 
solutions to avoid reliability and deliverability violations.
Power flow studies used in transmission planning provide a basis for identifying uses 
of, or impacts on, the transmission system at peak, shoulder and off-peak times for 
which violations are identified and solutions determined. Identification of impacts 
of individual generators and loads is essential in determining generation and load 
deliverability. 
Understanding the locations of generation and load and impacts on the transmission 
system is one step toward identifying parties that might be considered beneficiaries 
of transmission expansion, and provides a way in which to view and compare cost 
allocation methodologies.18 PJM © 2010
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SECTION 4: Allocation of Costs – Interpreting Beneficiaries and  
       Socialization
Any discussion of transmission cost allocation will almost always include the phrase “beneficiary pays.” 
Beneficiary pays is meant to convey the idea that only parties who benefit from transmission upgrades pay for 
them. In contrast, some transmission cost allocation methodologies are characterized as “socializing” costs. 
The idea of the socialization of costs is meant to convey the concept that transmission infrastructure costs are 
allocated to a wide array of parties. 
Unfortunately,  there  has  never  been  a  consensus  on  a  precise  definition  of  who  should  be  considered 
beneficiaries or what constitutes socialization.
Beneficiaries
The parties that benefit from transmission upgrades or projects depend on the perspective from which viewed. 
On a general level, beneficiaries can be defined as users of the transmission system who actually affect flows on a 
particular transmission facility in service. From a transmission power flow perspective, generators and loads can 
be identified as impacting flows on various transmission facilities through distribution factors (Dfax). From this 
perspective, beneficiaries may be seen as “cost causers” – the parties using the facility are causing the costs on 
that facility.
In identifying beneficiaries as those affecting flows on transmission facilities, it can be argued that it is these 
parties who are enjoying the majority of the reliability and/or monetary benefits of the new transmission assets. 
Beneficiaries can be identified through power flow studies and market efficiency analyses that are employed in 
transmission planning.
Yet another perspective is that beneficiaries may also be defined more broadly. There may be benefits that accrue 
to all parties connected to the transmission system regardless of impacts on power flows, such as enhanced 
reliability, reduced impact of fuel price and fuel market variations, reduced opportunity for market power and 
the ability to better meet public policy goals. These beneficiaries cannot be identified through power flow studies 
or market efficiency analyses, rather they are one or more steps removed from transmission planning analyses.
Beneficiaries Defined by Power Flows
The idea of using Dfax to identify beneficiaries can become more complicated when considering the impact on 
transmission facilities prior to an upgrade to solve a potential reliability criteria violation, or impacts on facilities 
after the upgrade. The rationale for delineating beneficiaries based on flows causing the violation, prior to the 
upgrade, rests on the idea that those parties with the impacts on facilities that are overloaded are causing the 
violations and therefore are beneficiaries of the upgrade. However, it can also be argued that those parties creating 
the flows are identified based on timing and circumstance. Under different assumptions and different sequences 
of other changes in generation, load and transmission upgrades, flows would not be causing a criteria violation.
Defining beneficiaries based on the responsibility of flows upgrades rests on the argument that those parties 
impacting flows on the upgrade facility are using that facility, and thus are benefitting from the facility. To the 
extent that the parties whose flows are impacting the facility pre-upgrade and post-upgrade are the same and 
have similar impacts, these two views may lead to similar identification of beneficiaries. However, if those parties 
whose flows affect the upgraded facility are not the same parties whose flows led to the overload violation, then 
the identification of beneficiaries may be quite different.
Defined in Monetary Terms
Another way to identify beneficiaries is to use a monetary metric based on expected changes in production 
costs, wholesale energy prices (e.g., LMPs) and/or expected changes in energy expenditures and revenues. These 19 PJM © 2010
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changes are driven by a combination of production costs and wholesale energy prices, along with expected 
consumption or generation. There may also be capacity market benefits when transmission expansion allows for 
fewer constrained areas and reduced capacity expenditures for some load and increased capacity revenues from 
some generation. 
Following  this  particular  interpretation  of  beneficiary,  production  costs,  wholesale  energy  prices,  energy 
expenditures/revenues,  capacity  market  prices  and/or  capacity  market  expenditures/revenues  are  compared 
before and after the proposed project is placed into service. Those parties attaining monetary benefits in these 
circumstances would be identified as the beneficiaries of the project.
Defined in Broader Terms
As  discussed  above,  transmission  expansion  may  also  have  broader 
impacts on fuel markets and prices, market competitiveness, and achieving 
public  policy  goals  beyond  those  parties  who  may  be  beneficiaries  as 
defined through power flow and market efficiency analyses. For example, 
transmission projects that facilitate the entry of new resources that increase 
fuel diversity and overall supply can be said to benefit all load in the market through enhanced competitiveness, 
reduced fuel prices and, presumably, lower energy prices. In this case, the claimed benefits cannot be verified 
through transmission planning analyses since they do not examine associated fuel market impacts or the results 
of enhanced competitiveness.
The achievement of public policy goals, such as increased renewable resources or job creation or increased 
tax base, may benefit parties beyond the impact on power flows or monetary impacts in wholesale energy and 
capacity markets. Additionally, these more broadly defined beneficiaries may be identified based on public good 
or positive externality attributes stemming from transmission as they relate to reliability.
The  concept  of  transmission  project  beneficiaries  can  have  multiple,  reasonable  interpretations  to  various 
parties. Consequently, greater precision is necessary in identifying the beneficiaries by explicitly defining the   
criteria used.
Socialization
Similarly, the interpretation of socialization of transmission costs depends on the perspective of the parties using 
the term. Socialization could mean that costs are being allocated across a wide array of parties without regard 
to whether some parties being allocated costs are beneficiaries of the transmission upgrade/project. Such an 
interpretation assumes that beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries can be readily identified such as through power 
flow and market efficiency analyses conducted in the transmission planning context, and that some costs are 
being allocated to non-beneficiaries. This interpretation can convey that beneficiaries are either “free-riding” or 
shifting cost responsibility to parties who derive little or no benefit from the transmission upgrade/project.
Another possible interpretation of socialization is that all users of the transmission system benefit from the 
transmission upgrade/project due to the public good or positive externality of reliability that transmission provides. 
Or because there may be additional benefits in the form of positive externalities that can accrue to all users of the 
transmission system in the form of reduced losses which are manifested in the price of energy in LMP markets. 
In addition, there may be other benefits that are derived at least one step removed from what can be identified 
through transmission planning analyses. In this interpretation, the allocation of costs over all users of the system 
is just another form of beneficiary pays because all users of the system benefit.
Yet another view of the meaning of socialization stems from the idea that it is difficult to identify beneficiaries. 
This is because such beneficiaries may change over time as a result of a changing transmission system and 
generation and load configurations. Eventually, all users of the system will be beneficiaries of multiple projects 
so that costs can be allocated to the larger body of parties on the system. Similarly, with socialization it may be 
difficult to determine the share of the public good or positive benefit that accrues to each party connected to   
the system.
The  concept  of  transmission  project 
beneficiaries  can  have  multiple, 
reasonable  interpretations  to  various 
parties.  Consequently,  greater 
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SECTION 5: Evaluating Cost Allocation Methods – 
       Practical Considerations
Other ways to evaluate cost allocation methods may include: 
1.  understandability 
2.  administrative ease 
3.  ability to reflect system changes over time 
4.  the stability of rates stemming from the cost allocation method used to recover transmission costs 
5.  short-term and long-term incentives for generation and load and 
6.  recognition of the public good and positive externality aspects of transmission infrastructure.
Understandability
The ability to easily understand the types of cost allocation methods is important for stakeholders; a simple 
allocation methodology makes allocation transparent and easily explainable. In this sense, stakeholders can 
understand how costs are allocated and how their decisions may affect the cost of transmission service.
Administrative Ease
Administrative ease pertains to gathering and using the necessary data in order to allocate the costs by the 
methodology in question. As a general rule, administrative ease is closely correlated to ease of understanding 
because allocation methods with fewer data requirements and steps are more easily understood and administered.
Ability to Reflect System Changes Over Time
Historically, loads have grown. The mixes of generation capacity and dispatched generation across a regional 
system changes with entries and retirements of capacity, as well as with changing fuel costs that affect the 
pattern of dispatch over time. Cost allocation methods can be evaluated based on their ability to reflect evolving 
system conditions to ensure the method still assigns costs as intended.
Stability of Transmission Rates Resulting from Cost Allocation
Cost allocation methods that maintain stable transmission rates may be preferable for those parties responsible 
for paying for transmission service. Stability in the transmission rates or expenditures help facilitate more accurate 
forecasting of future business conditions and needs from the transmission customers’ point of view.
Short-Term and Long-Term Incentives for Generation and Load
Cost allocation methodologies may create incentives that either reinforce or counteract the incentives that 
wholesale energy and capacity markets have been designed to provide. Transmission cost allocation methods 
should at least be neutral and not run counter to incentives provided in the energy and capacity market designs. 
Ultimately, cost allocation methods should reinforce the market signals from the energy and capacity markets.
Public Good and Externality Aspects of Transmission Infrastructure
The transmission system has characteristics, in the economic sense, of a public good, which can benefit market 
participants. A public good is non-rivalrous, which means that one party’s enjoyment of the service does not preclude 
other parties’ from enjoying the same service. A public good also is non-excludable in that nobody can be prevented 
from enjoying the good or service. Grid reliability is an example of a public good.21 PJM © 2010
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The  transmission  system  can  also  create  positive  and  negative  externalities. 
Externalities  occur  when  individuals  or  organizations  make  decisions  or  engage 
in activities for which there are benefits (positive) or costs (negative) that accrue 
to other parties. These other parties are not directly part of the decision-making 
process or directly involved in the activity that created the benefits or costs. 
Any cost allocation method can be assessed as to whether it recognizes the public 
good and/or positive and negative externality aspects of transmission infrastructure. 
Public good and/or positive externality characteristics of transmission infrastructure, 
such as reduced losses and reliability, are usually not directly estimated in power flow 
or transmission planning market efficiency analyses. This is because it is difficult 
directly to assign benefits due to public good or positive externality characteristics.
On the other hand, negative externalities from transmission, such as congestion or 
loop flows from outside the transmission system, are captured to a large extent in 
power flow and market efficiency studies.
Public Good and Positive Externality Benefits Found in Transmission Planning 
Studies
Reliability provided by transmission can be viewed as a public good, in that all parties 
connected to the grid can enjoy the reliability the system provides. Thus, building 
additional transmission to ensure reliability may be viewed as a positive externality in 
that there may be other parties connected to the system that may not have been part 
of, or responsible for, the decision to expand transmission, but still may benefit from 
the enhanced reliability it provides.
Reductions  in  line  losses  that  result  from 
additional  transmission  also  can  be  viewed  as  a 
positive  externality.  It  is  likely  that  transmission 
that  addresses  reliability  or  deliverability  criteria 
violations at peak periods will have excess capacity 
available in non-peak hours. This transmission may 
even  have  excess  capacity  available  at  peak  for 
some period of time. This excess capacity provides 
benefits to market participants in the form of reduced line losses.
However, it can’t be necessarily concluded that all services provided by transmission 
infrastructure are all public goods or provide positive externalities. In moving power 
across the system, one party’s use of transmission can prevent another’s use of the 
system, as evidenced by the presence of congestion on the transmission system. 
Additionally, entities can be excluded if they are unwilling to pay for interconnection 
or  abide  by  interconnection  and  other  relevant  requirements.  In  this  sense, 
transmission provides a private good in the form of transmission service to move 
power between different points on the system.
Negative Externalities Evident in Transmission Planning Studies: Cross Border or 
Loop Flows
Congestion created by loop flows within a transmission system is one example of 
a negative externality. Loads within a constrained area or generators outside of a 
constrained area are not directly responsible for congestion caused by loop flows, 
but must bear a cost. This cost is in reduced revenues in the case of the generator, 
or increased costs in the case of the load. Power flow studies and market efficiency 
analyses can detect those parties bearing the cost. There is also the matter of loop 
flows caused by neighboring transmission systems that can lead to congestion in 
short-term operations or contribute to potential reliability violations. This can occur 
despite the source of the loop flows being located in a different transmission system 
Reliability provided by transmission 
can be viewed as a public good, in 
that all parties connected to the 
grid  can  enjoy  the  reliability  the 
system provides. 22 PJM © 2010
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within the same interconnection. These loop flows cause costs to market participants who may not have been 
responsible for them. The solution to the problem is to define more widely the areas over which costs can be 
allocated. Unless neighboring systems are willing to share in costs associated with loop flows across transmission 
systems, these negative externalities will continue.
Public Good and Positive Externality Benefits Not Identified in Transmission Planning Studies
There may also be other examples of a public good or positive externality characteristics that are not reflected in 
transmission planning analyses. For example, if transmission expansion allows for new, emissions-free resources 
to be available to parties connected to the transmission system, sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxide (NOx), 
mercury (Hg) and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions may be reduced, providing health and environmental benefits 
to society. And, while connecting emissions-free, renewable energy to the transmission system may be a public 
policy objective, the environmental and health benefits are also a positive externality, and a clean environment is a 
public good. Similarly, transmission expansion can result in job creation, business expansion and/or an enhanced 
tax base. Individuals, businesses and governments that receive these benefits through positive externalities may 
not have necessarily “caused” the need for transmission to be expanded, but do benefit from the expansion in 
ways that cannot be captured by transmission planning analyses.
Some RTO planning processes have already alluded to benefits that are not generally identified in planning 
studies. The Midwest ISO leaves open the possibility for stakeholders to add criteria such as public policy 
objectives, economic development benefits, and national security considerations.40 The New York ISO considers 
non-quantifiable benefits such as environmental benefits and renewable energy integration among others as 
appropriate.41 The California ISO in its economic assessment framework considers reliability benefits from an 
economic perspective, strategic environmental benefits and benefits from operational flexibility.4223 PJM © 2010
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SECTION 6: Allocation of Costs – Generation Versus Load
An overriding question is whether to assess costs to generators, load or both. In the vertically integrated utility 
environment prior to retail restructuring of the electric utility industry and the advent of organized wholesale 
power markets in much of the United States, generation and transmission were planned together and built to 
serve load. Operating under cost-of-service regulation, utilities were allowed to recover their costs and a return 
from the load they served. Appropriately, all transmission costs were allocated to load with generation bearing 
none of the cost burden. Some parts of the country have not undergone retail restructuring and continue to use 
the vertically integrated model for transmission planning and cost allocation.
In today’s regulatory environment in which competitive generation and load conduct business on the transmission 
system in wholesale markets, there is the chance that both generation and load could be beneficiaries of 
new transmission upgrades/projects. It is not necessarily the case that new generation is built and existing 
generation maintained to serve specific loads. Instead, generation competes on a contract basis or through 
wholesale spot markets to serve load, which is no longer necessarily tied to a specific generator or set of 
generators. 
All parties use the transmission system to either deliver generated energy to the market or withdraw that energy 
to serve load. Accordingly, some argue that it is appropriate in this environment for at least some transmission 
costs to be allocated to generation.
Allocating Costs to Load or Generation
The FERC in its recent Notice of Request for Comments asked whether “the determination of ‘beneficiaries’ of a 
transmission facility should include generators as well as loads.”43 The answer will depend upon how the use of 
the term transmission system is interpreted, how beneficiaries are defined and whether such costs could or would 
ultimately be passed through to loads.
One view is that all transmission costs will be passed through to loads in the wholesale market, as they are in 
the vertically integrated regulatory environment. This assumes that generation will be able to recover the cost 
of transmission, either through the wholesale energy market or through an existing wholesale capacity market 
construct, or both. A similar view is that generation and transmission are constructed to benefit load in the same 
way as in the vertically integrated environment, and therefore it is only the loads that are really beneficiaries of 
transmission upgrades/projects.
A contrasting view is  that  new merchant generators also are  beneficiaries  of transmission  projects  in that 
transmission facilities provide the means by which that merchant power can be delivered. This view is based 
on the fact that for new interconnection, in some RTO markets, generators are required to pay for transmission 
upgrades for delivery throughout the RTO, or to prevent reliability or deliverability criteria violations. Such 
interconnection costs can be considered part of the fixed cost (capacity cost) of generation. Because there is 
already recognition that new generator interconnection may require transmission upgrades, it can be recognized 
that generators who may not need to pay for interconnection upgrades are beneficiaries of transmission facilities.
Allocating Costs to Load or Generation: U.S. Practices
As a general rule, all RTOs in the United States allocate the cost of transmission infrastructure to load. The 
manner in which load is allocated cost and the rate design for cost recovery differ across RTOs, but load remains 
responsible for paying for transmission infrastructure.
As a general rule, generators interconnecting to the transmission system are responsible for the cost of direct 
interconnection facilities, except for a special case in the California ISO. This exception in the California ISO   
relates to the interconnection of renewable resources, primarily wind. The California ISO has developed a new 
class of transmission/interconnection facility known as a Locationally Constrained Resource Interconnection 24 PJM © 2010
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Facility (LCRIF). The costs of the LCRIF are allocated to load until resources are interconnected to the LCRIF, 
but once a generator is interconnected, it pays for its contribution on the LCRIF as determined by the capacity 
of the interconnecting generator.44 
In some RTO contexts generators are responsible for paying some transmission infrastructure costs over and above 
the cost of interconnection facilities. Currently, these are specific to generator interconnection rather than part 
of the general cost allocation method for the bulk of transmission infrastructure. For example, in PJM, New York 
ISO and ISO New England generators requesting interconnection to the transmission system must pay for 100 
percent network upgrades beyond the necessary interconnection facilities in order to alleviate potential reliability 
violations of their interconnection, to ensure deliverability as a capacity resource, or meet other interconnection 
requirements.45 In the Midwest ISO generators pay for most upgrade costs, except for select transmission zones, 
while in the Southwest Power Pool (SPP) only wind resources may be subject to paying for interconnection 
upgrades.46 In this way, some generators are paying for transmission. There may be instances in which generators 
requesting interconnection do not cause reliability violations or have any deliverability problems. In these cases, 
generators only pay for their direct interconnection facilities.
Generators interconnecting in ERCOT and the California ISO are not responsible for any transmission upgrade 
costs resulting from interconnection as they are allocated entirely to load.47
To the extent generators are responsible for cost of transmission upgrades should they be necessary, the need 
for generators to pay for network upgrades is a function of their place in the interconnection queue and forecast 
system conditions. Consequently, generators have incentives to try to manage positions in the interconnection 
queue by strategically withdrawing and re-entering the queue in order to potentially avoid paying for network 
upgrades.
Finally, there is now a preliminary proposal, being circulated in the Midwest ISO to shift some costs to generators 
in what is being called an “Injection/Withdrawal” proposal. Under the Midwest ISO proposal costs for higher-
voltage transmission facilities would be split between load and generation.48
Allocating Costs to Load or Generation: International Practices
Internationally,  there  is  a  greater  acceptance  of  generators  being  allocated  some  costs  associated  with 
transmission infrastructure. Within the European Union (EU) where electricity competition is the standard policy, 
there is a wide variance in how much transmission infrastructure cost is allocated to generation. In 13 countries, 
including Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany, generators are not allocated any portion of the cost of 
transmission infrastructure.49 However, there are 12 other EU member countries where generation is allocated 
some portion of transmission cost, ranging from a half percent in Poland to 35 percent in Norway, as shown in 
Table 4. These countries combined are approximately one-third the size of the U.S.25 PJM © 2010
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Table 4: Relative Shares of Transmission Costs Allocated to Generation and Load in European Countries
Country Percent to Generation Percent to Load
Austria 18 82
Denmark 2-5 95-98
Finland 12 88
France 2 98
Great Britain 27 73
Greece 15 85
Ireland 20 80
Italy 8 92
Norway 35 65
Poland 0.5 99.5
Romania 22.62 77.38
Sweden 25 75
Source: European Transmission System Operators, ETSO Overview of Transmission Tariffs in
Europe: Synthesis 2008, June 2009, at 6, available at http://www.entsoe.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/_library/publications/etso/tariffs/Final_Synthesis_2008_
final.pdf
It is interesting to note that EU countries with mature or organized wholesale energy markets similar to the U.S. 
RTO markets, such as Great Britain; NordPool countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland) and Ireland, 
do generally allocate some portion of transmission cost to generators, as shown in Table 4, though it differs 
significantly by country. In contrast, Spain, which operates a centralized spot market similar to U.S. RTO markets, 
allocates all transmission costs to load, as do Belgium and the Netherlands in which power is actively traded on 
independent exchanges.
In other parts of the world where wholesale energy markets are in operation, transmission costs are often allocated 
to generation as well as load, though not universally, as is the case in Australia. Singapore where load is 100 
percent responsible for transmission costs.50
In South America, specifically Brazil and Chile, generation bears a relatively large share of transmission costs. 
The exact cost breakdown for Argentina is not known or been reported, but given the methodology, the cost share 
is potentially quite large for some generators far from the load center in Buenos Aires.51 In South Korea, which 
operates a simpler type of market known internationally as a single-buyer market, cost allocations are evenly split 
between generation and load.52 In New Zealand, the general rule is to allocate transmission costs to load, except 
for the cost of the high-voltage direct current (HVDC) link between the two main islands (North and South), which 
is allocated entirely to the generation on the South Island.5326 PJM © 2010
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Table 5 provides a summary of how transmission infrastructure costs are allocated between generation and load 
in selected countries.
 
Table 5: Relative Shares of Transmission Costs Allocated to Generation and Load in Other Selected Countries with Wholesale   
Power Markets
Country Percent to Generation Percent to Load
Australia 0 100
Brazil 50 50
Chile 80 20
New Zealand 100% to HVDC link between North and South Island. 
0% for remainder. 
100% of all transmission and 0% HVDC link
Singapore 0 100
South Korea 50 50
Source: Frontier Economics, International Transmission Pricing Review: A Report Prepared for the New Zealand Electricity Commission, July 2009, at 28-33, 
available at http://www.electricitycommission.govt.nz/pdfs/opdev/transmis/tpr/International-transmission-pricing-review.pdf27 PJM © 2010
A Survey of Transmission Cost Allocation Issues, Methods and Practices
SECTION 7: Allocation of Costs over Megawatt-Hours of 
           Consumption and/or Generation
One  possible  method  for  allocating  the  costs  of  transmission  is  spread  costs  over  megawatt-hours  of 
consumption and/or generation regardless of location or use at peak. Costs may also be implicitly spread over 
megawatt-hours through marginal loss or congestion surpluses which would reflect locational considerations. 
Allocating costs over megawatt-hours can be referred to as a form of socialization of transmission costs. 
One  interpretation  of  this  socialization  is  that  some  parties  who  are  non-beneficiaries  of  transmission 
construction are allocated costs of transmission. Another interpretation is that all parties connected to the 
system benefit from enhanced reliability, possibly reduced line losses, and other public good or positive 
externality benefits.
U.S. Practice in Allocating Costs over Megawatt-Hours
The California ISO allocates transmission cost over megawatt-hours for transmission facilities at 200 kV and 
above.54 The New York ISO allocates costs to transmission customers on a megawatt-hour basis, but the allocation 
of costs for new transmission projects to transmission zones are allocated based on a combination of peak load 
and location-based methods.55 While not in actual operation, there is currently a proposal in the Midwest ISO, 
as previously mentioned, known as the “Injection/Withdrawal” proposal, that would shift the allocation of some 
transmission costs over to a megawatt-hour-basis for both load and generation.56
International Practice in Allocating Costs over Megawatt-Hours
International practice is split into two different categories of allocating some transmission infrastructure costs over 
megawatt-hours. The first is a simple allocation over megawatt-hours generated or consumed. All EU countries 
allocate some portion of their transmission costs through megawatt-hour charges, though only six countries 
allocate all transmission costs on a megawatt-hour basis.57 Transmission companies in Australia have the option 
to allocate a portion of its transmission costs on a megawatt-hour basis.58 In Norway, the transmission company 
Statnett allocates costs to generation through the use of megawatt-hour charges.59
The other method for allocating transmission costs on a megawatt-hour basis uses the so-called marginal loss and/ 
or congestion surplus – the difference between what is collected in locational energy prices from load and what 
is paid out in locational energy prices to generators to cover the cost of transmission. The use of congestion or 
marginal loss surplus as a means to recover transmission costs introduces a locational component into megawatt-
hour charges, but only covers of portion of transmission infrastructure costs and requires additional means by 
which to recover the cost of transmission infrastructure. The use of congestion and marginal loss surplus is 
explicit in Argentina and Chile where the nodal pricing of energy is employed.60 Norway and Sweden explicitly 
include marginal losses in their tariff structures and presumably any surpluses would go toward covering the cost 
of transmission infrastructure.61
Congestion and Marginal Loss Surplus, ARR/FTR Allocations and Cost Allocation
There is a distinct difference in the way prices by location (to account for congestion and marginal losses) are 
treated internationally relative to the United States. The use of congestion and marginal loss surpluses as a 
method for allocating and recovering the cost of transmission infrastructure implies that any remaining charges 
allocated to transmission customers are lower than they would be otherwise.
In the case of New Zealand’s nodal pricing, the surpluses are rebated back to transmission customers rather than 
directly going toward the recovery of infrastructure costs.62 In Brazil, energy prices are computed on a zonal basis 
accounting for congestion and marginal losses, but adjust marginal losses so that there is no surplus.63 However, 28 PJM © 2010
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the use of congestion surpluses as a rebate or as a way to cover transmission costs 
leaves no mechanism for transmission customers to hedge against congestion costs.
In U.S. RTO markets with locational marginal pricing or nodal pricing such as PJM, 
transmission customers paying for the infrastructure are allocated Auction Revenue 
Rights (ARRs) which can then be converted directly into Financial Transmission 
Rights  (FTRs)  or  sold  at  auction,  the  proceeds  of  which  are  a  hedge  against 
congestion costs. The congestion rents are used to pay the holders of FTRs who 
hold these rights as a hedge against congestion rather than being used to recover 
transmission infrastructure costs. With all else being equal, transmission customers 
are allocated a larger cost for transmission charges. However, in exchange for that 
they receive a hedge against future congestion costs.
Transmission Planning Context
In  the  context  of  transmission  planning  studies,  the  allocation  of  costs  over 
megawatt-hours does not correlate, in general, with how the system is planned 
because the impact at system peak and the location of generation and/or load may 
not be a consideration in allocating costs. Loads that are large consumers and have 
flat load profiles do not drive system peaks and may be allocated greater costs 
relative to being allocated costs over peak usage which drives planned transmission 
capacity additions. If the allocation of costs over megawatt-hours is not locationally 
differentiated, all else equal, loads close to generation may bear greater costs than 
transmission power flow studies would indicate such loads are causing as represented 
by distribution factors. 
In contrast, loads with low load factors, but contributing much to the system peak, 
may be allocated a smaller portion of the cost relative to their contribution to the 
need  for  transmission  expansion  to  meet  peak  load  conditions.  Loads  far  from 
generation could pay less than the relative impact they have on the transmission 
system at peak as represented by distribution factors used in transmission power 
flow studies.
However, if the allocation of costs over megawatt-hours encompasses the use of 
marginal loss or congestion surpluses, then there is a locational component in the 
allocation of costs that corresponds to transmission power flow studies. Loads far 
from  generation  (and  generation  far  loads)  contribute  relatively  more  to  losses, 
for example, and would be charged accordingly. On net the use of the marginal 
loss or congestion surplus to cover transmission infrastructure costs accounts for 
transmission system impacts by location of the users of the system.
Understandability and Administrative Ease
Allocating costs over megawatt-hours is relatively simple for loads and generation 
to understand because the rate is the total cost of transmission divided by the total 
megawatt-hours of consumption and/or generation. The allocation could be forward-
looking by using a forecast of consumption and/or generation during the next year, 
or the allocation could be retrospective by allocating costs based on megawatt-hours 
of consumption and/or generation from the previous year. From an administrative 
perspective, all that is needed to set the rate is the forecast or previous year total 
consumption and/or generation in megawatt-hours as the divisor, and the total costs 
of transmission, which are already known.
The use of marginal loss or congestion surplus is slightly more complex to explain to 
market participants and may be slightly more difficult to administer, but otherwise 
has  the  same  properties  as  allocating  costs  over  non-locationally  differentiated 
megawatt-hours.
Cost allocation by:  
MWh Energy 
Simple to understand and easy to 
administrate
Reflects load growth and other system 
changes
Rates remain generally stable as long as 
consumption does not change dramatically.
Reinforces incentives for energy efficiency
Implicit recognition of public good (like 
reliability of the system.)29 PJM © 2010
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Changes Over Time
As individual loads and generators change their total consumption and generation from year to year, the cost 
allocation method can change the relative shares of cost accordingly. For example, if one load reduces its 
consumption systematically from one year to the next, its share of costs allocated to it will be reduced relative 
to other loads. Conversely, if a load increases its consumption by relatively more than other loads, it will be 
allocated a higher fraction of transmission costs. Allocation of costs over megawatt-hours through marginal loss 
or congestion surplus accounts for changing system conditions, usage patterns, and underlying fuel prices as 
they occur.
Stability of Rates
As long as the transmission costs to be recovered and the consumption 
and generation of the load do not change much over time, rates associated 
with a megawatt-hour allocation will be stable. However, with added costs 
of new infrastructure going into service, transmission rates will not remain 
stable going forward. For costs being recovered through the marginal loss or 
congestion surplus, these implicit rates for cost recovery are quite unstable 
and vary with changing system conditions and underlying fuel prices.
Short-Term and Long-Term Incentives
If transmission costs are allocated as a function of megawatt-hours of consumption and/or generation, there is 
an incentive for loads to engage in energy efficiency to reduce transmission costs, similar to those in the energy 
market. Incentives for demand response (shifting load from peak to off-peak periods) are less clear because 
shifting from high energy cost periods to low energy cost periods does not necessarily help to avoid transmission 
costs. If marginal loss or congestion surpluses are used to recover transmission costs, this incentive is locationally 
differentiated so that transmission loadings may be reduced overall.
If generators are allocated costs on a non-locational megawatt-hour basis, this creates an incentive to add the cost 
of transmission into offers in the energy market which may lead to an inefficient dispatch of resources. However, 
using marginal loss or congestion surpluses should not distort offer behavior or the efficiency of dispatch.
As for long-term incentives to locate loads or new generators, there is no additional incentive to locate load 
or generation in a place that would help reduce congestion or losses if there is no locational component. If 
anything, the allocation of costs over all megawatt-hours may work counter to the incentives and price signals 
provided by locational marginal prices for energy and locational capacity prices. However, the use of marginal 
loss or congestion surplus does reinforce incentives for generators or loads to locate in places that help relieve 
congestion or reduce losses.
There is little incentive to reduce peak loads, as is the case for capacity obligations, as the allocation of costs is 
not dependent on peak load, but only on consumption over the entire year.
Implicit Recognition of the Public Good and Positive Externality Aspects
In allocating costs over megawatt-hours of consumption and/or generation, it could be argued that there is 
an implicit recognition of the public good and positive externality qualities that transmission infrastructure 
provides. Since all consumers of power enjoy reliability at all times, and arguably higher volume consumers and/
or generators enjoy reliability to a greater extent than do lower volume consumers and/or generators, they would 
be paying more for reliability than would the lower volume consumers.
With respect to losses, there is a trade-off between paying for transmission infrastructure and paying for marginal 
losses in the energy market or as part of the transmission tariff. By allocating costs on a megawatt-hour basis, 
there is a direct comparison and trade-off shown between losses over the course of a year and the costs for extra 
transmission capacity to reduce those losses. 
As long as the transmission costs to be 
recovered  and  the  consumption  and 
generation  of  the  load  do  not  change 
much  over  time,  rates  associated  with 
a  megawatt-hour  allocation  will  be 
stable.  However,  with  added  costs  of 
new  infrastructure  going  into  service, 
transmission rates will not remain stable 
going forward.30 PJM © 2010
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Higher volume consumers and/or generators paying a greater share of transmission costs also enjoy the benefit of 
reduced losses, while lower volume consumers and/or generators pay less for transmission while also getting less 
benefit in the form of reduced losses.
With respect to public good or positive externality benefits, such as reduced emissions or greater fuel diversity, 
that are not quantifiable through transmission planning studies, the allocation of costs over megawatt-hours may 
be an implicit recognition of these types of benefits that might be enjoyed by all users of the transmission system.31 PJM © 2010
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SECTION 8: Allocation of Costs Over Peak MW Usage 
        and/or Generation
The costs of transmission can be allocated over the coincident or non-coincident peak megawatt consumption 
and/or generation without regard to location. Allocating costs in this way has been labeled by some as form of 
socialization of transmission costs. The term socialization can be interpreted to mean that non-beneficiaries 
are allocated costs due to a lack of locational considerations. In contrast, socialization of costs could be 
argued to reflect the public good and positive externality qualities of transmission that are difficult to assign. 
U.S. Practice in Allocating Costs over Peaks
In current practice, most RTOs in the U.S. allocate some or all transmission costs based upon some idea of 
coincident or non-coincident peak load or generation. However, peak load or generation is not always employed as 
the sole means to allocate costs of transmission additions/upgrades but is a complementary part of cost allocation 
practices in the U.S.
PJM allocates all costs associated with transmission facilities at 500 kV and above based on each zone’s 
contribution to the non-coincident zonal peak64; for transmission upgrades below 500 kV PJM allocates costs to 
transmission zones based on flow impacts determined from peak conditions.65 Similarly, the New York ISO uses 
coincident system peak conditions in conjunction with other criteria to allocate the cost of reliability upgrades 
to individual zones, although individual customers are allocated costs on a megawatt-hour basis.66 The Midwest 
ISO allocates part of its transmission expansion costs to transmission customers based on monthly coincident 
zonal peaks.67 SPP allocates its transmission upgrade costs based on monthly zonal peak, but also has a flow-
based component to its allocation.68 The California ISO uses an interconnecting resource’s maximum capacity 
to allocate costs on Location Constrained Resource Interconnection Facilities (LCRIFs).69 ISO New England 
allocates all costs associated with transmission upgrades through peak charges and does so based on monthly 
peaks rather than annual system peaks.70 ERCOT allocates all transmission costs based on the share of average 
monthly coincident system peak over the months of June through September.71
International Practice in Allocating Costs over Peaks
All but six EU countries allocate some portion of their transmission costs through charges based on some kind of 
peak megawatt concept, but none uses peak load or generation allocation to recover all transmission costs.72 For 
example, in Great Britain generators are allocated costs based on their maximum capacity, and loads are allocated 
costs based on their usage at the three coincident peaks after accounting for locational impacts.73 Statnett in 
Norway allocates costs to load via charges based on the average peak loads over the previous five years.74
Sweden allocates costs based on network capacity reservations, which presumably would match the potential 
peak usage.75 Australia and New Zealand also allocate a portion of their transmission costs on a peak-load basis. 
Generators on the South Island in New Zealand are charged for the HVDC link based upon their maximum 
injections at any point in time.76
In South America, Brazil allocates approximately 80 percent of its transmission costs based on peak loads or 
maximum generating capacity.77
Much like the U.S., international practice in employing cost allocation over peak load or generation generally is 
used as a complement to some other method. In many cases, such as in Australia, Great Britain, Sweden, Norway 
and Brazil, this method is complementary to the use of location-based or flow-based methods.32 PJM © 2010
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Transmission Planning Context
Because transmission is generally planned to meet the system peak, the allocation 
of costs over peak megawatt use and/or generation matches the way the system is 
planned. It also tends to allocate a greater portion of the cost to loads with low load 
factors that contribute much to the system peak commensurate with their impacts 
at peak. In contrast to allocating costs over all megawatt-hours of consumption and/
or generation, allocating costs over peak megawatts tends to reduce the allocated 
share of costs to loads that have flat load profiles (high load factors).
However, cost allocation over peaks alone does not account for the location of 
generation and/or load. Peak loads close to generation could pay more than the 
relative  impact  they  have  on  the  transmission  system  according  to  distribution 
factors, while similar-sized peak loads far from generation could pay less than their 
relative impact on the transmission system according to distribution factors.
Understandability and Administrative Ease
Allocating costs over all peak megawatt usage and/or generation is relatively simple 
for loads and generation to understand in that the rate is the total cost of transmission 
divided by the total megawatts at peak. The rate could be made forward-looking 
by using a forecast of peak megawatt use and/or generation during the next year, 
or the allocation could be done retrospectively by allocating costs based on peak 
megawatt use and/or generation from the previous year. From an administrative 
perspective, all that is needed to set the rate is the forecast or previous year’s peak 
megawatt by transmission customer and in total as the divisor and the total costs of 
transmission, which are already known, to derive the rate system-wide and the cost 
for each customer.
Changes Over Time
As individual loads and/or generators change their peak usage and/or generation 
from year to year, the method allows the relative cost allocation shares to change 
accordingly. For example, if one load reduces its peak usage systematically from one 
year to the next, its share of costs allocated to it will be reduced relative to other 
loads, that remain constant, or grow – as would be the intent of the cost allocation 
method. Conversely, if a load increases its peak usage by relatively more than other 
loads, it will be allocated a higher fraction of transmission costs.
Stability of Rates
As long as the transmission costs to be recovered do not change much over time 
and the peak consumption of load or injections from generation do not change 
relative to other parties, then the rates associated with a peak megawatt allocation 
will be stable. However, if the costs allocated through peak megawatts are designed 
to make up for costs not recovered through megawatt-hour charges, then the rates 
derived from peak megawatt allocations will not be as stable.
Short-Term and Long-Term Incentives
In this cost allocation methodology transmission costs are allocated as a function 
of peak usage and/or generation. Thus this methodology reinforces the incentive 
that  would  exist  in  the  energy  market  to  reduce  peak  energy  costs  and  in  the 
capacity market to reduce capacity costs. This cost allocation method reinforces the 
incentives present in the energy and capacity markets from the perspective of load. 
Unlike  the  allocation  of  costs  across  megawatt-hours  of  consumption  and/or 
generation, allocating costs based on peak megawatts does not distort the incentives 
Cost allocation by:  
Peak MW 
Simple to understand and easy to 
administrate
Reflects load growth and other system 
changes
Rates remain generally stable
Reinforces  incentives  for  energy  efficiency 
and demand response
Implicit  recognition  of  public  good  (like 
reliability of the system.)33 PJM © 2010
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for energy consumption, energy efficiency, demand response or generation in the energy market as transmission 
costs are not effectively rolled into the price of energy per MWh.
As for long-term incentives to locate loads and/or generation, there is no additional incentive to locate new load 
or generation in a place that would help reduce congestion although there are incentives to minimize peak use of 
new loads along the same lines as in the capacity market.
Implicit Recognition of Public Good and Positive Externality Aspects
There is an implicit recognition of the public good and positive externality qualities that transmission infrastructure 
provides through the allocation of costs over megawatts of peak use and/or generation in much the same way as 
there is in allocating costs over megawatt-hours of consumption and/or generation. Because all consumers enjoy 
reliability at all times regardless of location, and, because higher peak-load consumers and/or generators with 
high levels of peak generation value reliability especially at peak, they are paying relatively more for reliability 
than lower peak-usage consumers and/or generators with lower peak generation.
With respect to transmission losses, there is a trade-off between paying for transmission infrastructure and paying 
for marginal losses in the energy market where the benefits of reduced losses accrue to loads and generators 
through their consumption and generation over the year and not just at system peak. However, allocating costs on 
a peak megawatt basis does not provide a direct comparison or trade-off between reduced losses over the course 
of a year and the costs for extra transmission capacity to reduce those losses. The impact of reduced losses is 
observed in the energy market on a megawatt-hour basis while the cost of transmission is based on megawatts 
at peak.
As is the case with the allocation of costs over megawatt-hours, the allocation of costs over peak megawatts 
of consumption or generation does implicitly recognize some benefits such as reliability or reduced losses are 
difficult to assign and may be enjoyed by all users of the transmission system. It also may be an implicit 
recognition of other benefits that may be enjoyed by all users of transmission of benefits that cannot be quantified 
directly through planning studies such as the achievement of renewable energy policy goals or environmental 
benefits.34 PJM © 2010
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SECTION 9: Allocation of Costs by Flow-Based Methods
Flow-based cost allocation methods reflect users’ impacts on the transmission system under various system 
conditions. 
The impacts of load and generation can be derived directly from power flow models used in transmission 
planning and system operations. This method also can use location as a proxy for a more precise measure of 
impacts derived from power flow models used in transmission planning. 
Flow-Based Methods Defined
Flow-based methods link flows on particular transmission assets back to loads and generation through the use 
of distribution factors and allocate costs according to a market participant’s relative impact on transmission 
facilities. In transmission planning, load flow studies’ distribution factors are used to determine the impact of load 
and generation on transmission facilities at forecast system peaks. Distribution factors also are used to determine 
impacts of load and generation on flows that ultimately determine LMPs during actual real-time system dispatch. 
Given that the cost allocation corresponds to the impacts of load and/or generation on transmission facilities, 
flow-based methods can be considered related to the idea of beneficiary pays.
Flow-based methods can allocate costs based on loads and/or generation that have contributed to the reliability 
or deliverability violation prior to the implementation of a transmission solution for those violations. In this case, 
the determination of the beneficiaries assumes that those who contributed to the violation benefit from resolving 
the violation and that the beneficiaries remain fixed over time.
Flow-based methods may also define beneficiaries as those loads and/or generators that contribute to flows on the 
upgraded facility. Those parties using the facility, as determined by their distribution factor impacts, are deemed 
to benefit without regard to the flows that may have caused the violation. Defining beneficiaries in this manner 
allows for the possibility of the set of beneficiaries changing over time as the power system evolves with changing 
transmission and generation infrastructure and changing load patterns.
A proxy for using flow-based methods to allocate costs are location-based methods where geographic location 
assumed to determine the impact of generators or load on flows over transmission assets. Location-based methods 
can be a reasonably accurate proxy for flow-based methods in transmission systems that are more radial in nature 
and loop flows are not prevalent.
U.S. Practice in Allocating Costs by Flow Basis
Reliability-Based Upgrades
In current practice, most RTOs in the U.S. employ some type of locational differentiation, usually based on flows 
as determined by distribution factors to allocate some part of transmission costs. In most cases, the use of flow-
based methods is combined with the use of the system at peak use – coincident or non-coincident – in order to 
determine the cost allocation. 
ERCOT has no location-based cost allocation scheme, but only allocates costs over system peaks.78 ISO-New 
England has a procedure to identify potential localized costs stemming from a transmission upgrade that would 
be allocated to a subset of load in the RTO.79 The California ISO has the notion of Locationally Constrained 
Resource Interconnection Facilities for some generator interconnections but otherwise has no locational basis for 
allocating transmission costs.80
PJM allocates all costs associated with transmission facilities below 500 kV built for reliability based on the 
contribution of load at system peak to flows contributing to violations.81 Those loads zones contributing to the 35 PJM © 2010
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violations are considered the beneficiaries of the upgrade and are allocated costs based on their distribution factor 
contribution to flows that resulted in the violation. Given the prospective nature of the beneficiary determination, 
the cost allocation remains fixed over the life of the upgraded asset.82
PJM and the Midwest ISO also use distribution factors on constrained facilities to determine cost allocation of 
cross-border facilities built to relieve constrained cross-border transmission facilities. Each RTO then uses its 
own internal cost allocation method to allocate the RTO share of costs of the cross-border facility to load within 
the RTO.83
The Midwest ISO employs a distribution factor methodology for allocating all costs of transmission upgrades. For 
transmission at 345 kV and above, it allocates 20 percent of the upgrade costs on a system-wide basis based 
on peak load shares and the remaining 80 percent based on distribution factor methods, while 100 percent of 
upgrade costs from 100 kV to 344 kV are allocated to zones based on distribution factor methods.84
Similar to the Midwest ISO, SPP’s method allocates 33 percent of the cost of reliability-based transmission 
upgrades system-wide and the remaining 67 percent on a megawatt-mile basis as determined by the use of load 
flow models.85
The  location-based  cost  allocation  in  the  New  York  ISO  uses  an  iterative  method  to  determine  locational 
allocations for upgrade costs, examining location specific reliability violations, and, if transmission solutions to 
those violations alone are sufficient for the system, the local zones alone pay for the upgrades.86 The process 
works outward to a system-wide level where any required upgrades would be allocated system-wide and then 
back to examining violations due to constrained interfaces where costs would be allocated only to those zones 
contributing to the flows on the constrained interfaces.87
Economic-Based Upgrades
The RTOs that employ location-based or flow-based methods for reliability upgrades also use similar flow-based 
tools in evaluating economic upgrades. However, the focus of cost allocation for economic upgrades emphasizes 
monetary metrics rather than actual flows or geographic location, as will be seen below.
International Practice in Allocating Costs by Location or Flow Basis
The international trend is toward the use of location-based or flow-based 
methods to allocate and recover at least some portion of transmission costs. 
In some cases, flow-based methods to recover transmission costs are used 
to provide locational signals to generators and load in markets where there 
is no nodal or LMP pricing. For example, in Great Britain, where there is 
no LMP in the energy market, a charge is derived from a load flow analyses 
which differentiates a portion of transmission charges based on location.88 Generators in the north and loads 
in the south of the country pay higher locational charges, while generators in the south (around London) may 
actually face negative charges because they are close to the load center.89 Generators close to the load center may 
even be paid for free up transmission capacity due to their location under this method.90 However, the locational 
charges in Great Britain do not recover the entirety of transmission costs, and the remaining costs are recovered 
based on usage at system peak.91
Sweden uses any marginal loss surplus and marginal loss differences to provide a time and locational basis 
to cost allocation for transmission. The remaining transmission costs are recovered through a geographically 
differentiated cost allocation designed to capture what flow-based allocations would capture. Generators face 
higher charges in the north where generation is located, and lower charges in the south closer to the load centers, 
while load in the north faces lower charges than load in the south.92 Norway is similar to Sweden in that it uses 
congestion and loss surpluses which are locationally based93, but otherwise uses identical peak charges for load 
and megawatt-hour charges for generation in a departure from the Swedish methodology.94 
Around the Pacific Rim, South Korea allocates 50 percent of transmission costs based on load-flow methods95, 
and Australia similarly uses flow-based methods to allocate approximately half of transmission costs.96
The international trend is toward the use 
of location-based or flow-based methods 
to  allocate  and  recover  at  least  some 
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Flow-based methods, often referred to as “area of influence” methods, are prevalent in 
Latin American markets, being used in Argentina, Chile and Brazil. In Argentina and 
Chile, congestion and marginal loss surpluses from nodal pricing (LMP) are used to 
allocate and recover some portion of transmission cost.97 The costs allocated through 
the area of influence method are based on the impacts online or transformer flows.98
In  Argentina,  upgrades  are  based  on  economics  as  well  as  reliability.  Proposed 
transmission upgrades must be approved by 70 percent or more of the identified 
parties  that  would  affect  flows  on  the  new  facility  and  consequently  pay  for   
the  facility  in  a  manner  similar  to  what  is  done  for  economic  upgrades  in  the   
New York ISO.99
In Brazil, the flow-based cost allocation recovers only approximately 20 percent of 
all transmission costs because the measured flows on lines is quite low on average, 
whereas facilities that would be close to fully loaded would have a larger portion 
recovered through the flow-based allocation. Another charge, based on peak usage 
for load or maximum capacity for generators100, is assessed in order to recover the 
remaining 80 percent of transmission costs as has been referenced above.
Transmission Planning Context
Flow-based  and  location-based  methods  can  be  viewed  as  a  direct  offshoot  of 
transmission  planning  studies.  Market  participants  are  charged  according  to  the 
impact they have on transmission facilities, which accounts for their locations relative 
to generation and loads on the system at system peak. Loads and/or generators that 
have greater impacts on transmission facilities according to the flows they cause pay 
a greater share of costs associated with those transmission facilities. Loads and/or 
generators that have smaller impacts on flows on transmission facilities pay a smaller 
share of the costs associated with those transmission facilities. Large peak loads 
close to generation will pay a relatively smaller share of transmission costs than large 
peak loads that are far from generation, who pay a greater share of transmission costs. 
Along the same lines, if generators are allocated cost responsibility, generators far 
from load have greater impacts on transmission and correspondingly are allocated a 
greater share of transmission cost; generators close to load have smaller impacts on 
transmission and are allocated a smaller share of transmission cost.
In contrast to allocating costs either by total megawatt-hours of consumption and/or 
generation or by peak megawatt usage and/or generation, in flow-based methods the 
electrical location of the load and/ or generation is a determinant in how costs are 
allocated. Costs are allocated to loads and/or generation according to their impacts on 
the transmission system in terms of both peak usage and location.
Understandability and Administrative Ease
Allocating costs based on the impacts of individual loads or generators based on 
distribution factors, while intuitively appealing to some, is a more complex cost 
allocation method for load, generation and other interested parties to understand in 
practice than the allocation of costs over megawatt-hours or peak megawatts. The 
version of the flow-based cost allocation method used also may affect the ease of 
understanding with a method that remains fixed over time potentially being easier to 
understand than a method that may change cost allocation shares over time.
The administrative burden of flow-based methods also depends upon the choice 
of whether beneficiaries are determined based on contributions to the violation for 
which the new transmission facility is designed to resolve or whether beneficiaries 
are determined by the impacts of parties on the new facility itself. Determination of 
beneficiaries prior to the new transmission facility is easily taken from the distribution 
Cost allocation by:
Power Flow 
Identifies impacts and specific beneficiaries 
If beneficiaries identified prospectively, does 
not reflect system changes
Rates likely to remain stable if beneficiaries 
identified prospectively
Reinforces incentives for optimal location of 
new generation and load
Does not recognize public good (like system 
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factors in the power flow study identifying the violations. And, given these beneficiaries remain fixed over time, 
this method would be administratively straightforward.
Determining beneficiaries by impacts after the transmission facility has gone into service and allowing the set 
of beneficiaries to change over time is administratively more difficult. Power flow studies based on the actual 
system peak conditions would be required each year to derive the distribution factors applicable to loads and/or 
generation in order to determine the cost allocation. Such an exercise is not insurmountable but requires more 
time and resources than other allocation methods discussed to this point.
Location-based methods such as the method employed in Sweden is administratively easier to carry out as 
geography serves as a proxy for power flows.
Changes Over Time
The  robustness  of  flow-based  methods  to  changing  system  conditions  over  time  also  depends  on  whether 
beneficiaries are determined based on contributions to the violation which the new transmission facility is 
designed to resolve or whether beneficiaries are determined by the impacts of parties on the new facility itself. 
While determining beneficiaries based on contributions to the violation is administratively straightforward, it does 
not allow cost allocation to change with changing system conditions. Conversely, determination of beneficiaries 
based on flows after the new transmission facility has gone into service does allow for the set of beneficiaries to 
change over time, although it may be more administratively burdensome to allow for this flexibility.
Stability of Rates
With the prospective identification of beneficiaries undertaken by U.S. RTOs in their use of flow-based methods, 
the rates derived from such a cost allocation remain fixed over the life of the transmission upgrade. With 
retrospective allocation of cost using flow-based methods, transmission rates can easily fluctuate from one year 
to the next as changing dispatch patterns change the contribution to flows on transmission facilities.
Short-Term and Long-Term Incentives
Given that transmission costs are allocated based on impacts as a function generally of peak usage and/or 
generation as well as electrical location, the incentive for loads to engage in either energy efficiency or demand 
response activities to reduce their share of transmission costs is similar to the incentive that would exist in the 
energy market to reduce peak energy costs and in the capacity market to reduce capacity costs. As for long-term 
incentives to locate load and/or generation, use of a flow-based cost allocation method provides an additional 
incentive to locate load and/or generation in a place that would help reduce congestion or reduce flows on 
transmission facilities that could forestall the need for new transmission infrastructure. And, if generation is 
allocated transmission cost, the incentive is consistent with and reinforces the incentives present in capacity 
markets with locational prices.
Implicit Recognition of Public Good and Positive Externality Aspects
Whether flow-based methods implicitly recognize public good or positive externality qualities of transmission 
infrastructure depends on other implementation options that have yet to be discussed. If the flow-based methods 
allocate all costs based on impacts on transmission facilities, then it can be argued that the methods would not 
recognize the public good nature of reliability or the positive externalities of reduced losses. This is because, 
when all costs are allocated to parties impacting the transmission facility based on the distribution factors in 
power flow analyses, no costs are allocated to others who may benefit from enhanced reliability, reduced losses, 
or other potential public good or positive externality benefits that may not be quantified in transmission planning 
studies.
However, a hybrid implementation of flow-based methods with allocation of some costs by peak megawatts or 
megawatt-hours of consumption and/or generation would recognize the potential reliability and reduced loss 
benefits that may accrue to other parties with little or no impact on flows over the transmission facility.38 PJM © 2010
A Survey of Transmission Cost Allocation Issues, Methods and Practices
SECTION 10: Allocation of Costs via Monetary Metrics
Allocating transmission costs via monetary metrics entails an examination of which parties will receive a 
monetary gain from a proposed transmission project. Possible monetary measures for identifying beneficiaries 
of transmission upgrades/projects are: expected changes in production costs, wholesale energy prices (e.g., 
LMPs in some organized RTO markets), and expected changes in energy expenditures/revenues that are driven 
by both production costs and wholesale energy prices as well as expected consumption or generation over the 
course of a pre-specified time period (one year, for example). For a proposed transmission project, wholesale 
energy prices and/or energy expenditures/revenues are compared through the use of simulations before and 
after the proposed project goes into service.
Application of Monetary Metrics
Application  of  monetary  metrics  likely  would  differ  depending  upon  whether  wholesale  energy  prices  are 
determined as locational marginal prices, wholesale energy prices are uniform or one or more of the parties 
involved in the planning process is a stand-alone vertically integrated utility. Monetary metrics within or between 
organized RTO markets with LMP are a straightforward result of market efficiency analyses, simulating the 
dispatch of the transmission system over the course of a future year as discussed below. 
In contrast, monetary metrics for transmission projects between multiple, vertically integrated utilities or between 
integrated utilities and organized wholesale markets may need to rely upon changes in production costs for each 
vertically integrated utility and/or organized market affected by the transmission project. Although the changes 
in production costs also are a result of the same market efficiency analyses used to determine LMPs in organized 
markets that use LMP, the monetary metric may differ because vertically integrated utilities outside RTO markets 
do not face LMP but, rather, are concerned with changing production costs.
Loads experiencing declines in production costs, wholesale energy prices and/or decline in energy expenditures 
can be considered beneficiaries. If generators are also allocated cost responsibilities, generators that see increased 
wholesale energy prices and/or increased revenues also can be considered beneficiaries. In this sense, allocating 
costs via monetary metrics is a form of beneficiary pays, but the benefits are defined in monetary terms rather 
than in terms of contributions to flows on transmission facilities as discussed in Section 9.
U.S. and International Practice in Allocating Costs through Monetary Metrics
Outside of the U.S. context, there is no discernible practice that directly uses monetary metrics for the allocation 
of transmission costs. Within the U.S. context, monetary metrics are applied only to what are considered economic 
upgrades, not upgrades that are built to specifically solve a reliability violation.
In PJM, economic upgrades must pass a benefit-cost test where the ratio of the present value of benefits to the 
present value of transmission costs over a 15-year period exceeds 1.25-to-1. Benefits are defined by energy 
and capacity market benefits.101 The energy market benefit is weighted 70 percent to reduced production costs 
and 30 percent to reduced load energy payments.102 The capacity market benefit is weighted 70 percent total 
capacity cost reduction and 30 percent to reduced load capacity payments.103 The allocation of costs for economic 
upgrades is assigned to zones by the share of LMP benefits (reduced load payments) accruing to the zone or by 
the use of distribution factors if the allocations are within 10 percent of the LMP benefit allocation.104
In the New York ISO, economic projects eligible for cost allocation and recovery must show that the production 
cost savings of the proposed economic project exceed the revenue requirement of the project over a 10-year 
period.105 The costs of the project are then allocated to zones based on the zonal share of total LMP cost 
savings.106 Within the zones the costs are allocated on a MWh basis.107 The project must also get 80 percent 
approval from the identified beneficiaries before going forward.10839 PJM © 2010
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In the Midwest ISO, economic projects are evaluated on a benefit-cost basis where 
benefits are weighted 70 percent toward an adjust production cost measure and 
30 percent to LMP changes and the costs are the annual transmission charges for 
the upgrade being evaluated.109 Economic upgrades that are to be allocated across 
all or parts of the RTO must exceed an increasing benefit-cost ratio that starts at 
1.2-to-1 in the first year of service, increases to 2-to-1 over five years, and 3-to-1 
in 10 years.110 If these tests are passed, 20 percent of cost is allocated system-
wide. The remaining 80 percent of costs are allocated to sub-regions on a relative   
benefit basis.111
ISO-New England also uses the criteria that a transmission upgrade’s benefits, 
which can include the cost of energy, capacity, losses, and prices of bilateral power 
contracts, must exceed the cost of the proposed upgrade.112 If the economic upgrade 
meets the definition of a regional benefit upgrade, then the costs are allocated across 
all load in ISO-New England based on the share of monthly zonal peak loads.113 
In SPP economic upgrades above 345 kV are evaluated as a portfolio of upgrades 
based on whether benefits, reductions in production costs, power purchase costs, 
and power sale revenues, exceed the costs represented by the revenue requirements 
of the portfolio of transmission projects system-wide and additionally at a zonal 
level.114 Approved economic upgrades are defined to benefit all zones and thus are 
allocated across all zones in SPP based on the share of zonal non-coincident peak 
loads.115 
Transmission Planning Context
The allocation of costs through a monetary metric is related to the transmission 
planning context in that much of the modeling framework is the same. However, 
rather than examining power flow studies at system peak in an attempt to identify 
potential reliability or deliverability violations, market simulations that incorporate 
power flow models are conducted over the course of a specified period of time 
(e.g., one year) to examine the production cost, wholesale energy price, expenditure, 
and/or revenue impacts of a new transmission facility. The effect of loads and/or 
generators on flows across transmission facilities is implicit in the market simulation 
modeling.116
Understandability and Administrative Ease
Allocating costs based on the production cost, wholesale energy price, expenditure, or 
revenue impacts on individual loads or generators has an easily understood intuitive 
appeal to all interested stakeholders, although the methods by which the results are 
derived are likely not so easily understood. Administratively, once the beneficiaries 
are determined through the market simulations, the set of beneficiaries for cost 
allocation purposes is likely to remain fixed over time given that the simulations are 
likely to be done prospectively.
However, if there is a desire to update the set of beneficiaries of a transmission 
project, then the administrative burden can become much larger. Updating the 
beneficiaries of a project would require extensive modeling and scenario analysis 
that would entail running market simulations retrospectively in the absence of the 
transmission facility in question to determine the new set of beneficiaries, making 
the administration of such an allocation method cumbersome.
Cost allocation by:  
Financial Gain
Identifies specific beneficiaries 
Does not reflect changes given prospective 
identification of beneficiaries
Rates likely to remain stable if beneficiaries 
identified prospectively
Reinforces incentives for energy efficiency 
or demand response and optimal location 
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Does not recognize public good (like system 
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Changes Over Time
If beneficiaries are determined prospectively based upon market simulations run under assumptions of future 
system conditions and remain fixed over time, then the use of monetary metrics is not adaptable to changes in 
system conditions over time. The set of monetary beneficiaries can easily change over time as new transmission 
facilities go into service, the configuration of generation changes and load patterns change. As discussed with 
respect to administrative burden, the administrative burden of attempting to account for changes in system 
conditions over time would present many challenges to implement.
Stability of Rates
In practice, the use of monetary metrics to define beneficiaries has been done prospectively, locking in the 
identified beneficiaries to a cost allocation for an upgrade. Such a method provides the most certainty over time.
Short-Term and Long-Term Incentives
For a monetary metrics-based cost allocation method, the costs of a transmission project for potential beneficiaries 
can be compared to the costs of other possible actions to achieve the same results. Such a comparison has been 
contemplated in the California ISO.117 Load has the incentive to engage in either energy efficiency or demand 
response activities to reduce its share of, or avoid completely, transmission costs similar to the incentives that 
would exist in the energy market to reduce peak energy costs and in the capacity market to reduce capacity 
costs. For new loads, the incentive is to choose a location that avoids congestion to the extent possible if such 
congestion is transparent through locational price signals in both the energy and capacity markets.  
If generators are allocated cost responsibilities, the cost of transmission to them can be compared to the expected 
change in revenues that might accrue to the generator. For new generators, the incentive is strong to choose a 
location that avoids being constrained by congestion, which reinforces the incentives provided by LMPs and 
locational capacity prices in organized wholesale markets where such mechanisms exist.
Implicit Recognition of Public Good and Positive Externality Aspects
Given that monetary methods allocate all costs based on financial impact, then it can be argued that monetary 
methods do not recognize the public good of reliability or the positive externalities of reduced losses or any other 
public good or positive externality benefits, since all cost would be allocated to those parties that experience 
beneficial monetary impacts and no costs would be allocated to others that may benefit from enhanced reliability, 
reduced losses or other benefits.
However, a hybrid implementation of monetary methods – with allocation of some costs by peak megawatts or 
megawatt-hours of consumption and/or generation – would implicitly recognize to some extent  the potential   
reliability and reduced loss benefits that may accrue to other parties with little or no impact on flows over the   
transmission facility.41 PJM © 2010
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SECTION 11: Moving Forward: Searching for Policy Consensus on    
                a Cost Allocation Method
The choice of allocation methodology depends upon the perspective of various stakeholders and of FERC as 
to what are the most important dimensions to evaluate cost allocation methods (i.e., transmission planning, 
need to ensure identified beneficiaries pay, ease of understanding, administrative ease, reflection that all users 
benefit in some manner, etc.).
Flow-based methods may be the primary choice if greater weight is placed on the identification of beneficiaries 
through the transmission planning exercise. Similarly, the application of monetary metrics may work if the 
parties that gain are evident and adaptability to changing system conditions is not important.
Conversely, if there is a wide belief that there are reliability benefits that accrue to all connected to the 
system, that all benefit from reduced losses with new transmission facilities, and ease of understanding and 
administration are important, then allocating costs across MWh or peak MW may be considered appropriate.
The determination of the most appropriate method for allocating transmission costs is a decision that is either 
a product of stakeholder consensus and/or a regulatory or legislative policy determination. There are multiple, 
sound arguments that can be made to support the various classes of methodologies.
Mixing and Matching Methodologies to Achieve Multiple Goals
There is no rule that dictates that only one type of methodology must be employed with respect to the allocation 
of costs. For example, stakeholders may find it desirable that some costs be allocated through flow-based or 
monetary metric methods, as outlined above, because of the importance of identifying and ensuring that all 
beneficiaries are specifically allocated costs. However, there may also be wide agreement that there are reliability 
benefits that all users of the transmission system enjoy. Consequently another portion of costs can be allocated 
on a MWh or peak MW basis, in effect socializing some of the costs because there are shared benefits.
Many cost allocation methodologies in use around the world today allocate some costs based on a notion of 
beneficiary pays, and the remaining costs are socialized in some way. Examples of this can be seen in PJM, the 
Midwest ISO, New York ISO and SPP in the United States as outlined in Appendix B. Internationally, Australia, 
Brazil and Great Britain allocate some portion of costs through flow-based methods, with the remainder spread 
out over peak MW as shown in Appendix C, but each country has developed its own split on how it allocates such 
costs and what portions are allocated to generation and what portions are allocated to load.
There is a continuum of combinations that are possible that could help achieve compromises between parties 
with divergent and strong preferences for the need to ensure beneficiaries pay or to socialize costs. A crucial 
aspect in reaching any sort of policy consensus is to put forth plainly and clearly what precisely is intended by 
beneficiaries pay or socialization, how each party views the benefits of transmission and what other characteristics 
are important, as this paper has attempted to do.
PJM has produced this document to advance the discussion of cost allocation and to facilitate a shared understanding 
of the issues. This paper does not espouse a particular policy or methodology. PJM encourages further discussion 
among interested stakeholders that would help policy makers and regulators decide how to best build future electric 
infrastructure.42 PJM © 2010
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APPENDIX A: Guide of Cost Allocation Methods
Cost  allocation  methods  (for  either  load  or  generation)  can  be  evaluated  by  many  common  characteristics,  including:   
1) understandability, 2) administrative ease, 3) ability to reflect system changes over time, 4) the stability of rates needed to 
recover transmission costs 5) incentives for generation and load, and 6) the public good aspects of transmission infrastructure.
The following charts offer a broad high-level guide for comparing these characteristics among the four general cost allocation 
methods.
Defining Cost Allocation Methods 
MWh – Energy consumed  Peak MW Usage Flow Based  Monetary Metrics
Allocating costs by megawatt-
hours of consumption or 
generation, regardless of peak 
usage. Could be system-wide or 
locational.
Form of socialization of 
transmission costs.
Allocating   costs   over 
peak megawatt use – either 
coincidentally or non-
coincidentally to the system 
peak – regardless of location or 
overall usage.
Form of socialization of 
transmission costs.
Allocating costs based on the 
relative impact that parties have on 
transmission facilities -- which is 
derived from power flow models or 
based on location.  
Form of beneficiary pays.
Allocating costs to parties 
who are expected to receive a 
monetary gain -- based on market 
simulations before and after 
the proposed project goes into 
service.
Form of beneficiary pays.
Ways to Evaluate Cost Allocation Methods 
Characteristic
MWh – Energy consumed 
or produced Peak MW Usage Flow Based Monetary Metrics
Understandability 
Can stakeholders 
understand how costs 
are allocated? 
Simple Simple   Complex Complex
Administrative ease 
How easily can 
necessary data be 
gathered and used to 
allocate costs?
Easy – use megawatt 
consumption / 
generation over past 
year or forecast for next 
year.
Easy – use the previous 
year’s peak megawatt or 
forecast for next year. 
Not so easy – beneficiaries 
are determined through 
power flow studies based 
on relative impact on 
transmission facilities.  
Not so easy – beneficiaries 
are determined through 
market simulations based 
on monetary gain.  
Reflect system changes 
over time 
Is load growth or other 
changes in system 
conditions reflected 
in the cost allocation 
method? 
Yes – Changes in total 
consumption/ generation 
result in changes to the 
allocation of costs. 
Yes – Changes in peak 
usage or generation 
result in changes to the 
allocation of costs.  
Maybe – Prospective 
identification of benefits 
probably remains fixed 
over time. Updates to 
identification of benefits is 
possible.
No – Monetary 
beneficiaries are likely 
to remain fixed over time 
because it identifying 
financial impacts on an  
on-going basis is complex.  
Stability of rates 
Do rates derived from 
the cost allocation 
method remain stable 
over the life of the 
transmission project?
Probably yes -- As long 
as use doesn’t change 
dramatically from year 
to year, rates will remain 
relatively stable.
Probably yes -- As long 
as peak consumption or 
generation doesn’t change 
relative to other parties, 
rates will remain relatively 
stable.
Maybe – Prospective 
identification of beneficiaries 
and rates likely remains 
fixed over time. 
Updating identification of 
beneficiaries is possible but 
may change rates.
Yes – Monetary 
beneficiaries are likely to 
identified prospectively 
and remain fixed over time.   
Updating would require 
extensive modeling and 
scenario analysis.48 PJM © 2010
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Characteristic
MWh – Energy consumed 
or produced Peak MW Usage Flow Based Monetary Metrics
Incentives for generation 
and load 
Are incentives 
created that reinforce 
or counteract the 
incentives provided 
within existing 
wholesale energy and 
capacity markets? 
Reinforces incentives 
to reduce electricity 
use through energy 
efficiency. 
May introduce 
inefficiencies if applied 
to generation.
Reinforces existing 
incentives to reduce peak 
usage through energy 
efficiency and demand 
response.  
Reinforces incentives for 
loads to reduce use through 
energy efficiency or demand 
response.  
Additional long-term 
incentive to locate load 
and generation in a place 
that would help reduce 
congestion.
Reinforces incentives 
for loads to reduce use 
through energy efficiency 
or demand response.  
Additional long-term 
incentive to locate load 
and generation in a place 
that would help reduce 
congestion.
Public good aspects
Are public good 
features (like reliability) 
recognized as part of a 
cost allocation method?   
Yes – Implicit 
recognition that all 
consumers enjoy 
public good (like 
reliability.) Higher 
volume consumers enjoy 
reliability more and pay 
more relative to lower 
volume consumers.
Yes – Implicit recognition 
that all consumers 
enjoy public good (like 
reliability.) Higher peak-
load consumers enjoy 
reliability and pay more 
relative to lower peak-
usage consumers with 
lower peak generation.
No – Costs are allocated 
based on relative impact 
on transmission facilities.  
Public good is generally not 
recognized.    
No – Costs are allocated 
based on financial impact.  
Public good is generally 
not recognized.  
Are positive 
externalities (reduced 
losses) 
recognized?  
Yes – Reduced losses 
are enjoyed by all 
users.  Higher volume 
consumers enjoy greater 
benefit from reduced 
losses and pay more 
relative to lower volume 
consumers.
Yes – Reduced losses 
are enjoyed by all 
users.  Higher peak-load 
consumers enjoy greater 
benefit from reduced 
losses and pay more 
relative to lower peak-
usage consumers with 
lower peak generation.
No – Positive externalities 
generally are not recognized.   
No costs are allocated to 
others who may benefit from 
reduced losses. 
No – Positive externalities 
generally are not 
quantified. No costs are 
allocated to others who 
may benefit from reduced 
losses.  49 PJM © 2010
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Appendix B: Matrix of U.S. RTO Transmission Cost Allocation Provisions
The following matrix has been prepared to provide a summary of all US RTO transmission cost allocation provisions and 
practices, including transmission upgrades related to generator interconnection. The source material for the matrix are the 
most recently revised and approved individual tariffs, agreements, or statutes that govern transmission cost allocation in 
the various RTOs and are summarized for the ease of exposition to conform to the categorization of cost allocation methods 
described in this paper. For readers interested in the actual language governing transmission cost allocation, references have 
been provided. 
PJM – Cost Allocation Practices
Reliability Upgrades
Upgrades at voltages of 500 kV and above, including any facilities below 500 kV need to support the 500 kV and above 
upgrades, are allocated 100 percent to load based on each zone’s share of zonal non-coincident peak load. Merchant 
transmission share is based on firm withdrawal rights.
Upgrades below 500 kV with costs less than $5 million are allocated to load in the zone in which the upgrade is required.
Upgrades below 500 kV with costs at or above $5 million are allocated 100 percent to load and merchant based on a flow-
based method that determines a zones share of cost based on its distribution factor (DFAX) contribution to flows on the 
constrained facility or facilities causing the need for the transmission upgrade. This allocation does not change over time.
PJM/MISO cross-border allocation uses flow-base method to calculate each RTO’s contribution to net flows on the constrained 
facility, and allocation within each RTO is based upon each RTO’s methodology.
Detailed descriptions for economic upgrades can be found in the PJM Tariff, Schedule 12 
Detailed description for cross-border allocation can be found in Joint Operating Agreement Between the Midwest Independent 
System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., December 11, 2008, 9.4.3.2 through 9.4.3.5
Economic Upgrades
Economic upgrades at voltages of 500 kV and above are evaluated using monetary metrics. If the benefit-to-cost ratio is greater 
than or equal to 1.25-to-1, the economic upgrade is included in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan (RTEP) and the 
costs are allocated in the same manner as reliability upgrades at 500 kV and above. Benefits include weighted reductions in 
energy production cost and capacity cost plus weighted reductions load energy payments and load capacity payments over 
a 15-year period. The costs are the annual revenue requirement of the transmission upgrade over the same 15-year period. 
Economic upgrades below 500 kV that are accelerations of approved reliability upgrades are allocated based on monetary 
metric based on zones experiencing  reduced LMPs during the period over which the upgrade is accelerated, or flow-based 
methods that use DFAX contribution to flows identical to that used for reliability upgrades at below 500 kV. If the there is 
no zonal percentage responsibility difference greater than 10 percent between the two methods, the DFAX method is used. 
Otherwise the monetary metric using reduced LMPs is used.
Economic upgrades below 500 kV that are modifications of approved reliability upgrades are allocated using flow-based 
methods that use DFAX contribution to flows identical to that used for reliability upgrades at below 500 kV to assign costs.
Detailed descriptions for economic upgrades can be found in the PJM Tariff, Schedule 12 and PJM Operating Agreement 
Schedule 6.
Generator Interconnection
Interconnecting generators are 100 percent responsible for minimum network upgrades necessary for interconnection of the 
generator that would not have otherwise been incurred under the RTEP but for the interconnection request.
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Southwest Power Pool (SPP) – Cost Allocation Practices
Reliability Upgrades
Upgrades with a cost less than $100,000 are allocated to the zone in which the upgrades are located.
For all upgrades at all voltage levels and with upgrade cost greater than $100,000:
Load is 100 percent responsible for all upgrade costs except for some upgrades related to generator interconnection as   
outlined below
33 percent of costs allocated regionally over all load in SPP based on monthly non-coincident zonal peaks.
67 of costs allocated to zones using a flow-based methodology that determines each zone’s share of incremental flows over 
the new assets (positive MW-mile benefits). Charges are allocated to customers within each zone based on monthly zonal 
coincident peak. The zonal share of costs appears to be updated each year 
A detailed description of the allocation methodology can be found in Attachment J, III.A.1.-3. of the SPP Tariff. 
A description of the flow-based method used to allocate costs to zones can be found in Attachment S of the SPP Tariff. 
Economic Upgrades
Economic upgrades above 345 kV are evaluated as a group known as a balanced portfolio. Approved balanced portfolios are 
allocated 100 percent to load across all SPP based on a monthly non-coincidental zonal peaks.
A balanced portfolio of economic transmission upgrades are evaluated based on the monetary metric of costs and benefits over 
a 10 year period. The costs of a balanced portfolio are the transmission charges paid to cover the costs, and the benefits are 
the reduction in production cost, cost of power purchases, and increase revenues from power sales. 
The balanced portfolio is approved only if the benefits exceed the costs over all SPP, and the benefits exceed the costs in each 
zone over the 10 year period.
If benefits exceed costs in SPP, but there is a zone where benefits are less than costs, there are provisions to shift the zone’s 
other transmission cost responsibility into the costs of balanced portfolio in order to achieve benefits greater than costs in the 
zone.
There are also other provisions to “re-balance the portfolio” should there be unexpected changes in operating conditions, but 
approvals for re-balancing must go through the stakeholder process.  
All other economic upgrades proposed separate from economic upgrades proposed as part of a balanced portfolio are paid for 
by the project sponsor. To the extent SPP sells transmission service provided by the upgrade, the project sponsor would receive 
credits from SPP to offset the cost.
Detailed descriptions for cost allocation of economic upgrades can be found in Attachment J and Attachment O of the   
SPP Tariff.
Generator Interconnection
Upgrade costs associated with non-wind generator interconnection for resources that do not exceed $180,000/MW of capacity 
are treated as reliability upgrades and are allocated in the same way as reliability upgrades discussed above. 
Upgrade costs associated with wind generator interconnection for resources that do not exceed $180,000/MW of capacity, and 
for which the upgrades are located in the same zone as the point of delivery are treated as reliability upgrades and are allocated 
in the same way as reliability upgrades discussed above. 
Upgrade costs associated with wind generation that do not exceed $180,000/MW of capacity, and for which the upgrades are 
located in a zone other than the point of delivery, are allocated 67 percent to all load in SPP based on the monthly zonal non-
coincident peak and the remaining 33 percent are allocated to the interconnecting party.
Any upgrade costs in excess of $180,000/MW of capacity are assigned directly to the interconnecting party.
Detailed descriptions for cost allocation of economic upgrades can be found in Attachment J, III.A. and Attachment Z1 of the 
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Midwest ISO (MISO) – Cost Allocation Practices
Reliability Upgrades
Upgrades at or above 345 kV are allocated 100 percent to load. 20 percent of costs are allocated based on average monthly 
coincident peaks across the entirety of MISO. The remaining 80 percent of costs are allocated through flow-based methods 
defining Line Outage Distribution Factor (LODF) used for sub-regional allocations.
Upgrades from 100 kV to 344 kV are 100 percent allocated to load. 100 percent of cost is allocated to pricing zones based 
on LODF load-flow methodology in Sub-regional percentage share for a given pricing zone is calculated as the relative zonal 
share of sum of absolute values.
PJM / MISO Cross-border: transfer distribution factor (DFAX) analysis to calculate impact of each RTO’s flows on constraint, 
based on Total Net Flow. Total net flow of each RTO on a constraint = (all positive flow) less (all counter flow). After allocation 
to each RTO, each RTO then allocates according to its own OATT. 
Details can be found in the MISO Tariff, Attachment FF, III. A. 2. c. and Schedule 9 and Attachment O.
Detailed description for cross-border allocation can be found in Joint Operating Agreement Between the Midwest Independent 
System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.,December 11, 2008, 9.4.3.2 through 9.4.3.5.
Economic Upgrades
Regionally Beneficial Projects (RBPs) with a cost greater than $5 million and at voltages greater than are evaluated on a 
monetary metric. Benefits are categorized as production cost changes (70 percent weighting) and LMP changes (30 percent 
weighting) and costs are the revenue requirements for the transmission project. Benefits and costs are compared over a 10-year 
period with ever increasing benefit-to-cost ratios necessary to make the upgrade “beneficial”: 1.2-to-1 after 1 year with the 
ration increasing linearly by 0.2/yr up to a 3.0-to-1 ratio in year 10.
Economic upgrades (RBPs) have 20 percent of costs allocated based on average monthly coincident peaks and the remaining 
80 percent of costs are allocated to three sub-regions based on the relative value of annual benefits.
If an upgrade is deemed both an RBP and a reliability upgrade, then the costs of the upgrade will be allocated as if it were an 
economic (RBP) upgrade.
Details can be found in the MISO Tariff, Attachment FF, II. B. 1. and Attachment FF, III. A. 2. f.  and Schedule 9 and 
Attachment O.
Generator Interconnection
Generator interconnection upgrades at voltages below 345 kV are 100 percent allocated to the interconnecting party except 
as described below.
Generator interconnection upgrades at voltages 345 kV and above are 90 percent allocated to the interconnecting party, and 
10 percent allocated system-wide based on monthly coincident peaks, except as described below
Interconnecting to American Transmission Company, International Transmission Company, Michigan Electric or ITC Midwest 
pricing zones: 50 percent of the cost is allocated to load in the same manner as reliability upgrades are allocated, and the 
remaining 50 percent are allocated directly to the pricing zone in which the interconnection takes place. The interconnecting 
customer is allocated no cost for upgrades in these zones.
Details can be found in the MISO Tariff, Attachment FF, III. A. 2. d. 3. and Attachment FF-ATCLLC.52 PJM © 2010
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New York ISO (NYISO) - Cost Allocation Practices
Reliability Upgrades
Regulated Reliability Transmission Project costs are allocated on a locational basis depending on the locations causing the 
reliability violation. Specific locational violations occurring in a zone or zones are allocated to the zone or zones in which 
those violations occur. Upgrades solving NYISO-wide violations are allocated to all zones in the NYISO based on their share 
of the coincident peak load in the NYISO. Upgrades solving reliability violations in only part of the NYISO due to constrained 
interfaces are allocated to the zones causing the violation based on each affected zone’s share of the coincident peak load of 
the affected zone.
A detailed description can be found in the NYISO Tariff, Attachment Y, D.14.
The rate structure by which costs are recovered from customers can be found in NYISO Tariff, Attachment H, 2.1 and NYISO 
Tariff 7B.1
Economic Upgrades
Economic upgrades are evaluated on the monetary metric of benefits exceeding costs over a 10 year period. The benefits 
are net present value of reductions in NYISO-wide production costs, and the costs are the net present value of revenue 
requirements. The upgrade must also have a cost in excess of $25 million.
The NYISO will also calculate other metrics including savings in zonal locational marginal cost, ancillary services, losses, 
transmission congestion contracts, capacity, emissions, and other metrics as appropriate.
Costs for economic upgrades are allocated based upon the zonal share of total energy expenditure savings across zones that 
have energy savings. Within benefitting zones, costs will be similarly allocated based on an LSE’s share of total energy (MWh) 
in the zone.
Load serving entities identified as beneficiaries are eligible to vote on whether to continue with the project. Each beneficiary’s 
vote is weighted by its identified share of benefits (energy savings).
In order for the upgrade to go forward under with the above cost allocation, the upgrade must receive 80 percent approval from 
the identified beneficiaries. 
A detailed description can be found in the NYISO Tariff, Attachment Y, D.15. 
Generator Interconnection
Interconnecting generators are allocated 100 percent of the costs of transmission upgrades to meet minimum interconnection 
standard if the upgrades would not be required but for the generator interconnection. 
Interconnecting parties have the option to pay for additional upgrades beyond the minimum interconnection upgrades and to 
the extent that future resources use the headroom, the interconnecting party would be reimbursed for the headroom that is 
used by future interconnecting facilities
Details can be found in the NYISO Tariff Attachment S, VI. A. and VII. B. 53 PJM © 2010
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ISO New England (ISO-NE) – Cost Allocation Practices
Reliability Upgrades
Reliability Transmission Upgrades (RTU) that are listed in the Regional System Plan (RSP) and that includes transmission at 
voltages of 115 kV and above and meet the criteria of being a Pool Transmission Facility (PTF) are 100 percent allocated all 
load across ISO-NE based on monthly zonal coincident peak loads.
Any costs of Reliability Transmission Upgrades that are considered by ISO-NE to be “localized costs”, or costs that exceed 
reasonable requirements for the upgrade, are allocated to the zone in which those costs are incurred. 
Detailed information can be found in the ISO-NE Tariff, Schedule 12 with respect to the cost allocation of upgrades and 
Schedule 9 with respect to the manner in which this is recovered from load.
Economic Upgrades
Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade (METU) upgrades are evaluated on the basis of the monetary metrics. If the net 
present value of benefits of reducing costs system-wide of providing energy, capacity, reserves, etc. is less than the net present 
value of the cost of the upgrade , then the upgrade can be considered for the Regional System Plan.
A METU deemed as needed and included in the RSP as a “planned” project is eligible for the same cost allocation treatment 
as a Reliability Transmission Upgrade so long as it is at or above 115 kV and meets the criteria as a PTF. Costs are allocated 
across all load in ISO-NE on a monthly coincident peak basis.
A METU that is not included in the RSP as “planned”, and is constructed has all costs allocated to the project sponsors.
All merchant transmission projects are paid for by the project sponsor.
Detailed information on the planning process can be found in the ISO-NE Tariff , Attachment K, Attachment N II.B.,  and cost 
allocation in Schedule 12.
Generator Interconnection
100 percent of direct generator interconnection costs are paid for by the interconnecting generator.
The interconnecting generator pays for 100 percent of all associated upgrades to meet applicable generator interconnection 
and reliability standards to the extent that such costs would not be incurred but for the interconnection.
If an interconnecting generator elects to have upgrades constructed unrelated to interconnection and reliability standards, 100 
percent of the costs are paid by the interconnecting generator. 
If  ISO-NE  determines  the  interconnection  upgrades  provide  benefits  to  the  system  as  a  whole,  then  the  costs  of  the 
interconnection upgrade are allocated to load as if they were a reliability upgrade.
For a detailed description see the ISO-NE Tariff, Schedule 11, Section 5. 54 PJM © 2010
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Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) – Cost Allocation Practices
Reliability and Economic Upgrades
PUCT-approved transmission costs, without regard to reliability or economic drivers, are allocated to 100 percent to load based 
on the average monthly coincident peak over the months of June through September. Costs allocated regionally to load and to 
power exports from ERCOT region, based on load-ratio share.
See Chapter 25, Substantive Rules Applicable to Electric Service Providers, Subchapter I Transmission and Distribution, 
Division 1 Open Access Comparable Transmission Service for Electric Utilities in the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, 
Section 25.192 Transmission Service Rates.
Generator Interconnection
The generator is responsible for direct interconnection facilities.
Any associated network upgrades beyond the interconnection facilities are paid for by the transmission service provider and 
allocated across load in the same manner as are other transmission assets.
See Chapter 25, Substantive Rules Applicable to Electric Service Providers, Subchapter I Transmission and Distribution, 
Division 1 Open Access Comparable Transmission Service for Electric Utilities in the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, 
Section 25.198 Initiating Transmission Service.
California ISO (CAISO) – Cost Allocation Practices
Reliability and Economic Upgrades 
The costs of all reliability or economically-driven upgrades 200 kV and above approved by the CAISO are allocated to all 
transmission customers on a megawatt-hour (MWh) basis across all load in the CAISO.
The CAISO may approve economically driven upgrades using the monetary metric where benefits exceed costs. Benefits 
include reduced production costs, congestion, capacity costs, losses or environmental costs. Costs, in addition to the cost   
of the transmission facilities, also consider the cost to maintain the simultaneous feasibility of long-term congestion revenue 
rights.
Merchant Transmission Facilities, whose costs are paid by a Project Sponsor that does not recover the cost of the transmission 
investment through CAISO transmission charges, may obtain Merchant Transmission Congestion Revenue Rights. 
Detailed information on transmission expansion can be found in the California ISO Tariff, Section 24, and in Appendix F, 
Schedule 3 with respect to the manner in which this is recovered from load.
Details on the benefit-cost framework can be seen in California ISO, Transmission Economic Assessment Methodology (TEAM), 
June 2004 which outlines in detail how the CAISO evaluates economic transmission upgrades.
Generator Interconnection 
Generally, the generation developer is 100 percent responsible for the cost of direct interconnection facilities.
The cost of upgrades beyond direct interconnection facilities associated with generator interconnection are treated in the same 
manner as reliability and economic upgrades and allocated 100 percent to all load in the CAISO on a MWh basis. 
The ISO also permits a unique approach whereby transmission projects necessary to connect generators in certain remote 
areas may have its costs socialized up-front.  The costs for these a Location Constrained Resource Interconnection Facilities 
are recovered through MWh-based charges to load until generators are interconnected, at which time costs will be assigned to 
such generators going forward on a pro-rata basis.
Detailed  information  on  interconnection  upgrade  costs  can  be  found  in  the  CAISO  Tariff,  Appendix  U  3.4,  and   
Appendix Y 12.3.
Detailed information on Location Constrained Resource Interconnection Facilities can be found in Sections 24.1.3 and 26.6   
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Appendix C: Matrix of Selected International Transmission Cost Allocation Provisions
The following matrix is designed to put in a single place the key transmission cost allocation methodologies for selected 
countries in which competitive wholesale power markets are managed.   
References regarding these methods are also provided.   A quick reference for each of these countries is 
Frontier Economics, International Transmission Pricing Review: A Report Prepared for the New Zealand Electricity Commission, 
July 2009, available at http://www.electricitycommission.govt.nz/pdfs/opdev/transmis/tpr/International-transmission-pricing-review.pdf.
Argentina
Congestion and marginal loss surpluses are used to help cover transmission infrastructure costs.
Remaining  transmission  infrastructure  costs  are  recovered  using  flow-based  methods  that  assign  costs  base  on  the 
contribution to flows on each line. Counter-flows are netted to zero.
A transmission customer’s share of cost for any asset is the percentage of flows on the asset attributable to the customer 
regardless of the total loading of the line.
Both generation and load are responsible for paying the cost of transmission, but the share of costs are determined within 
the flow based method.
In order for new transmission to be constructed, “beneficiaries” or those who have a positive impact on flows on new circuit 
are identified using a load flow analysis. In order for the line to be built, 70 percent of the beneficiaries must vote in favor 
of the line, otherwise it will not receive regulatory approval. 
Other References:
Ramon Sanz, “Argentinean Transmission System: Darks and Lights” in IEEE Power Engineering Society Energy Development 
and Power Generating Committee Panel Session: Organization of Transmission Structures in Latin America July 17, 2004 
pp. 9-20
Max Junqueira, Luiz Carlos da Costa, Jr., Luiz Augusto Barroso, Gerson C. Oliveira, Luiz Mauricio Thomé, and Mario Veiga 
Pereira, “Transmission Cost Allocation Schemes for Electricity Markets: A Game Theoretic Approach”, X Symposium of 
Specialists in Electrical Operation and Expansion Planning March 21-26, 2006, Florianopolis, Brasil
Australia
The recovery of transmission costs are split approximately 50-50 between flow-based methods and recovery of costs through 
what is termed a “postage stamp” rate.
The flow-based method is known as Cost Reflective Network Pricing (CRNP) and is very similar to long run marginal cost 
(LRMC) in that the relative contribution of flows when they are at their maximum on the line, which is multiplied by the 
replacement cost of the line to arrive at the cost responsibility for the line. Counter-flows are netted to zero. 
The postage stamp component can be in the form a peak capacity/demand charge or a megawatt-hour charge or some 
combination of the two may be used.
Load is 100 percent responsible for all transmission costs.
Other references:
Australian Energy Regulator, National Electricity Rules, Version 33, Chapter 6A: Economic Regulation of Transmission 
Services, Schedule 6A.3 – CRNP Methodology and Modified CRNP Methodology
Australian Energy Regulator, “Issues Paper: Pricing Methodology Guidelines”, April 2007 56 PJM © 2010
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Brazil
Recovery of transmission costs is split between a flow-based component and a postage stamp component.
The flow-based method examines the impact of users on each asset using the contribution to line flows on average over a 
variety of load scenarios. Because of the varied loadings over the course of a year in a hydro-dominated system. The average 
loading of a line is not large. 
A customer’s share of costs is equal to its pro rate share flows on the line multiplied by the percentage average loading of 
line multiplied by the cost per unit. Because the average loadings are generally small, the flow-based method only covers 
20 percent of cost.
The remaining 80 percent of cost is recovered through a peak usage/generation charge. 
Load and generation split the cost responsibility 50-50 as determined in advance.
While there is a marginal loss component in the energy price in Brazil, the loss factors are adjusted so there is no surplus 
available to offset transmission infrastructure costs 
Other References:
Luiz Augusto Barroso, Mario Pereira, Max Junqueira, Ivan Camargo, José M. Bressane, “Transmission Structure in Brazil: 
Organization, Evaluation, and Trends” in IEEE Power Engineering Society Energy Development and Power Generating 
Committee Panel Session: Organization of Transmission Structures in Latin America July 17, 2004 pp. 21-33.
Max Junqueira, Luiz Carlos da Costa, Jr., Luiz Augusto Barroso, Gerson C. Oliveira, Luiz Mauricio Thomé, and Mario Veiga 
Pereira, “Transmission Cost Allocation Schemes for Electricity Markets: A Game Theoretic Approach”, X Symposium of 
Specialists in Electrical Operation and Expansion Planning March 21-26, 2006, Florianopolis, Brasil
Norway
Norway is a part of the Nord Pool market, but undertakes congestion management and accounts for marginal losses 
separately from the other countries participating in the Nord Pool market.
The Norwegian grid operator Statnett levies a locational charge for marginal losses on all users of the system, where the 
marginal loss factors are changed weekly in order to reflect changing system conditions.
Statnett also prices energy by zones so that there is congestion to reflect transmission constraints.
Any marginal loss or congestion surpluses that are available help cover transmission infrastructure costs. 
Generators pay a megawatt-hour charge to help cover the remaining costs of transmission that does not vary by location.
Loads pay a peak charge to cover the remaining costs of transmission based on the average peak load over the previous 5 
years. This charge does not vary by location. 
Generators pay 35 percent of costs and loads 65 percent of costs, but this split is not determined exogenously.
Other references:
Statnett, “The Main Grid Tariff 2010”.57 PJM © 2010
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Sweden
Sweden, like Norway, is a part of the Nord Pool market, and also undertakes congestion management and accounts for 
marginal losses separately from the other countries participating in the Nord Pool market.
The Swedish grid operator Svenska Kraftnät levies a locational charge for marginal losses on all users of the system. The 
marginal loss factors are changed only once per year. There are no congestion surpluses as congestion is managed through 
counter-trading with the costs of congestion being uplifted to transmission users. 
Any marginal loss surpluses that are available help cover transmission infrastructure costs. 
Generators and loads pay a locationally differentiated peak charge that reflects the prevailing flows of energy from north to 
south. Generators in the north and loads in the south pay the highest charges while generators in the south and loads in 
the north pay the lowest charges.
Historically generators pay 25 percent of costs and loads 75 percent of costs, but this split is not determined exogenously.
Other references:
Svenska Kraftnät , “The Swedish Electricity Market and the Role of Svenska Kraftnät” 
United Kingdom (Great Britain)
Transmission costs are allocated via a flow-based method and a postage stamp peak demand charge to recover any costs 
not recovered through the flow-based method. 
The flow-based method is similar to long run marginal cost (LRMC) in that the relative contribution of flows when they are 
at their maximum on the line/asset are multiplied by the replacement cost of the line to arrive at the cost responsibility for 
the line. Counter-flows are recognized in the methodology and it is possible that transmission users face negative charges 
(paid for providing counter-flow)
Generators in London (load center) and loads in the north are the most likely to face negative charges, while loads in the 
south and generators in the north face the highest charges 
Remaining transmission costs not covered by the flow-based method are recovered through coincident peak charges to all 
users of the system based on the three highest peak hours from the previous year.
The UK power market does not use locational energy pricing so there are no marginal loss or congestion surpluses to be 
used to recover costs.
The cost responsibility between generation and load is pre-determined at 27 percent to generation and 73 percent to load.
Other references:
National Grid, UK, “The Statement of the Use of System Charging Methodology Effective from 1 April 2009”